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NOTES
TIPPING THE BALANCE: HILTON DAVIS AND THE SHAPE
OF EQUITY IN THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
It has ... been asked, what need of the word 'equity'9 '
Competing policies underscore almost every aspect of the
patent system. They shape choices between the ideals of capital-
ism and tolerance of limited monopolies, between the rights of
the individual and those of society, between the pursuit of the
state-of-the-art and the foreclosure of innovation. Such policies
shape the doctrine of equivalents no less, and the resulting ten-
sion has led to community-wide disagreement, lack of predict-
ability, and Supreme Court scrutiny of the doctrine.2 Caught
between the goal of advancing the technological arts and the
need for providing adequate notice to potential infingers, the
doctrine of equivalents seeks "to prevent an infringer from
stealing the benefit of the invention[,]"3 when an accused de-
vice4 does not infrnge literally5 any of the claims in the pat-
ent.6
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 539 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
2. On October 15, 1996, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments m its review
of the Federal CircuWs decision in Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson
Co., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1014 (1996).
3. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Lmde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950)
(quoting Learned Hand in Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 168 F.2d
691, 692 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 825 (1948)).
4. For the purposes of this Note, the term "device" will encompass devices, pro-
cesses, and any other form of invention.
5. See infra notes 50-53 and accompanying text (discussing literal infringement).
6. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607; see infra note 51 (explaining the specification
and claims of a patent).
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Without question, the doctrine of equivalents is a tool of equi-
ty.7 Recent debate, however, has questioned the way in which
the doctrine approaches the principles of equity. Discontent with
the focus of equivalency analysis, and especially with the roles
that juries and intent play in that analysis, has divided the
patent community.
8
Many in the community argue that the doctrine of equivalents
is an equitable doctrine outside the province of a jury because
the doctrine fails the historical test that determines whether a
particular action warrants a jury.' Others argue that the doc-
7. See Dolly, Inc. v. Spalding & Evenflo Co., 16 F.3d 394, 399 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(noting the Federal Circuit's recognition of the "equitable principles of the doctrine of
equivalents" in Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equip. Leasing, Inc., 872 F.2d 978, 989 (Fed.
Cir. 1989)); International Visual Corp. v. Crown Metal Mfg. Co., 991 F.2d 768, 774
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (Lourie, J., concurring) ("In recent years, we have emphasized that
the doctrine of equivalents is equitable in nature."); Texas Instruments Inc. v. Unit-
ed States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 988 F.2d 1165, 1173 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (noting that
"[i]nfringement under the doctrine of equivalents has been judicially devised to do
equity'" (quoting Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal, Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 870 (Fed. Cir.
1985))); Valnont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg. Co., 983 F.2d 1039, 1044 (Fed. Cir.
1993) ("The doctrine of equivalents equitably expands exclusive patent rights.").
8. The role of juries in patent cases has been the focus of much litigation re-
cently and has caught the attention of the Supreme Court. E.g., Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996); In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966
(Fed. Cir.), vacated, American Airlines, Inc. v. Lockwood, 116 S. Ct. 29 (1995). The
Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit ruling in Markman that juries are inap-
propriate in construing claims for the purposes of establishing a patent's validity,
Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1393-95, and will review the Federal Circuit's decision in
Hilton Davis that juries are appropriate in equivalency analysis. See Hilton Davis
Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116
S. Ct. 1014 (1996).
9. See, e.g., Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1539-43 (Plager, J., dissenting); id. at
1549-50 (Lourie, J., dissenting); id. at 1554-59 (Nies, J., dissenting); Stanley L.
Amberg, Brief for Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellee on the Third Question
Posed by the Court, Hilton Davis (No. 93-1088), reprinted in 3 FED. CMR. B.J. 357
(1993) [hereinafter Amberg Brief]; Federal Circuit Bar Association, Brief for Amicus
Curiae, Hilton Davis (No. 93-1088), reprinted in 3 FED. CIR. B.J. 345 (1993)
[hereinafter Federal Circuit Bar Briefi; Richard A. Machonkin, Note, Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc. and Hilton Davis v. Warner-Jenkinson Co.: The Federal
Circuit Gets Its Laws and Its Facts Straight, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 181 (1996).
The historical test set out in Chauffeurs Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391 v.
Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990), looks to the remedy sought and compares the issue at
bar with actions available at the time of the Seventh Amendment's adoption in 1791
in order to determine whether a particular action is legal or equitable and whether
the action warrants a jury. Id. at 565. Equitable actions do not warrant a jury un-
der this test. Id.
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trine is equitable only insofar as it ensures fairness in the pat-
ent system and, therefore, as a component of the larger, factual
infringement issue, should not preclude trial by jury." The re-
cent Supreme Court decision in Markman v. Westview Instru-
ments, Inc." may provide the first step toward resolving the is-
sue. In Markman, a unanimous Court held that juries have no
place in construing a patent's claims. 2 Although interpreting
claims has traditionally been an issue for the judge alone," the
court in Markman examined the propriety of allowing the jury to
construe claims when questions of fact exist regarding the cor-
rect construction. 4 The Supreme Court held that the Seventh
Amendment did not compel such a jury review. 5 Because claim
construction during literal analysis plays a vital role in deter-
mining the scope of equivalency for analysis under the doctrine
of equivalents, 6 the decision reinforced the judge's role in de-
fining the scope of equivalency. 7 Although the impact of
Markman on infringement analysis under the doctrine of equiva-
lents is unclear, the Court's discussion of issues stretching be-
yond the fact/law distinction to the doctrine of equivalents pro-
vides critical insight into the Supreme Court's current attitude
toward juries in patent cases. 8
In Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co.,
however, the Federal Circuit recently confirmed the continued
role of juries in determining patent infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents.2" Basing its decision largely on its char-
For want of a better term, "pure equity" will denote the type of issue triable to
a chancellor or judge without a jury.
10. See, e.g., Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1521-23; American Bar Association, Brief
for Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant, Hilton Davis (No. 93-1088), reprinted in
3 FED. CiR. B.J. 375 (1993) [hereinafter ABA Briefl.
11. 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
12. Id. at 1396.
13. Id. at 1393-95.
14. Id. at 1387-96.
15. Id. at 1396.
16. See infra notes 113, 115-25 and accompanying text.
17. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
18. See Machonkin, supra note 9.
19. 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1014 (1996).
20. Id. The Supreme Court has granted review of the Federal Circuit's decision.
116 S. Ct. 1014 (1996). Warner-Jenkinson's arguments, however, go more to the
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acterization of the word "equity,"21 the Federal Circuit rejected
the compelling arguments advocating the doctrine as a pure
equity issue22 and failed to account for a consideration of intent
in defining its notion of fairnessY Ultimately, the court upset
pervasive notions regarding both the jury's role in equivalency
analysis and the doctrine's motivating purpose.' In doing so,
the Federal Circuit sanctioned an analytical structure that will
disadvantage competitor/defendants.
Although an attempt to stabilize the doctrine of equiva-
lents,25 Hilton Davis represents the confusion and inadequacy
inherent in today's doctrine of equivalents analysis. The case
also exemplifies the historical tensions underlying the doctrine.
The doctrine of equivalents seeks to foster technological develop-
ment by protecting the patentee from the "unscrupulous copyist"
who, in an effort to avoid the literal extent of a patent's claims,
makes only insignificant changes when creating his own de-
vice.26 Indirectly, the doctrine of equivalents emphasizes the
importance of substantial differences between patented and un-
patented devices, advocating technological development by "leap-
frogging" rather than by encouraging successive, minor
improvements. 27 For all of its efforts to further technological
development, the doctrine of equivalents ultimately stifles that
validity of the doctrine of equivalents than to the propriety of juries or individual
elements in the equivalency analysis. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Warner-
Jenkinson Co., at 13-30, Hilton Davis (No. 95-728).
21. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1521-23.
22. Id. at 1520-21.
23. Infra notes 283-315 and accompanying text.
24. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607-08
(1950). Recognizing the impact of its decision, the majority in Hilton Davis prefaced
its discussion of the case's merits with the statement that "[tihis case presents an
opportunity to restate-not to revise-the test for infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents." Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1516.
25. Id.
26. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607-08.
27. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1532-33 (Newman, J., concurring). Judge
Newman suggested that "[i]f minor improvements are likely to be captured by the
doctrine of equivalents, this might cause the would-be competitor to move to diverging
areas instead of simply tagging along at the periphery of the patentee's claims." Id. at
1532 (Newman, J., concurring). As a result, the doctrine of equivalents could encour-
age "leapfrogging" advances as opposed to substantial imitation. Id. (Newman, J.,
concurring).
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development by providing patentees with hazy boundaries of
protection that fail to provide competitors with adequate no-
tice.2" The holding in Hilton Davis did little to either cure the
problem of inadequate notice or stem the rampant litigation that
results from lack of notice.29The creation of the Federal Circuit (designed to handle patent
cases and provide uniformity in patent law) brought with it a
dramatic increase in patent litigation 0 and fostered unprece-
dented interest in the use of juries.3 The creation of the Fed-
eral Circuit also enhanced the strength of patents, which, when
coupled with the problems of jury comprehension and biases
that favor the patentee,32 has increased patentees' incentives
to litigate.33
In this increasingly predatory environment, the doctrine of
equivalents is considered less a leveling device employed as an
exception to ordinary infringement analysis; it has instead be-
come "simply a second bite at the apple for the patent owner in
attempting to prove infringement."34 Hilton Davis effectively
nullified previous efforts to curb patentee advantages.35 As a
result, the doctrine has lost much of its equitable nature, and
the accused infringer finds himself severely disadvantaged in
the courtroom.36 Indeed, because Hilton Davis has increased
patentees' incentives to litigate, the accused infringer's chances
28. Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1543 (Fed.
Cir. 1987) (Newman, J., dissenting).
29. See Gary M. Hoffman & Eric Oliver, The Doctrine of Equivalents After Hilton
Davis, COMPUTER LAW., Feb. 1996, at 17.
30. See Jon F. Merz & Nicholas M. Pace, Trends in Patent Litigation: The Ap-
parent Influence of Strengthened Patents Attributable to the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 579, 580 & n.10 (1994).
31. See Abolition of Jury Trials in Patent Cases, 34 IDEA. J.L. & TECH. 77, 84,
93-94 (1994) [hereinafter Abolition].
32. See infra notes 334-67 and accompanying text.
33. See Michael P. Chu, Note, An Antitrust Solution to the New Wave of Predato-
ry Patent Infringement Litigation, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1341, 1341-54 (1992).
34. Clarence J. Fleming, The Doctrine of Equivalents-Should It Be Available in
the Absence of Copying?, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SocY 233, 234 (1994).
35. One example of these efforts is the greater burden placed on patentees to
prove infringement of all elements of the patented device. Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-
Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1009 (1988).
36. See infra notes 211-367 and accompanying text.
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of landing in the courtroom are enhanced significantly.37 Re-
storing the doctrine of equivalents to its exceptional, equitable
role will revive fairness for both patentees and infringers, 3 re-
strict much of the current predatory litigation, 9 and, ultimate-
ly, remove an impediment to technological development.4"
The Supreme Court should replace the current analytical
structure with one that requires the judge and jury to share
responsibility in the analysis. Under such a structure, the judge
would determine, as a threshold matter, the degree of differenc-
es between the patented and accused devices.4 If insubstantial
differences exist, and the trial is to a jury, the jury would then
be responsible for finding any factors that would aid in the in-
fringement determination.42 When examining these factors, it is
of critical importance that the jury consider the competitor's
intent.43 The jury must find that the competitor intended to
steal the patented device; otherwise, no infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents should exist." The judge would then
weigh the competitor's intent and any other applicable factors
against the substantiality of differences and make the final,
equitable determination on infringement.45 Such a structure
strikes a balance between the history of the doctrine of equiva-
lents and the current state of the patent system so as to ensure
fairness for both patentees and competitors.
This Note studies the current state of the doctrine of equiva-
lents in the highly-litigious patent community. The first section
explains the nature of patent infringement and examines the
historical underpinnings as well as the current role of the doc-
trine in determining infringement. The next section discusses
the Federal Circuit's articulation of the doctrine in Hilton Davis.
37. See Hoffman & Oliver, supra note 29, at 17.
38. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1560
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (Nies, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1014 (1996).
39. See Hoffman & Oliver, supra note 29, at 17.
40. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 614-15
(1950) (Black, J., dissenting).
41. See infra notes 256-64, 368-75 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 376-80 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 283-315 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 283-315, 373-74 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 215-55, 375 and accompanying text.
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The final section analyzes the court's decision in light of the
doctrine's history, the role of intent, and due process concerns
regarding notice and jury use. Finally, this Note uses the forego-
ing sections to support in detail the analytical structure suggest-
ed above.46
THE NATURE OF PATENT INFRINGEmENT AND THE DOCTRINE OF
EQUIVALENTS
"[A] narrow exception to our competitive enterprise sys-
tem,' patents provide necessary protection for the technologi-
cal arts. In providing for a system of patents, the Constitution
grants Congress the power to allow inventors limited monopolies
for their creations with the hope of furthering technological de-
velopment.48 Unauthorized manufacture, use, or sale of a pat-
ented device violates this monopoly right.49
Infringement can take one of two forms, literal or equiva-
lent,50 and the process of determining infringement focuses on
the patent's claims5 in essentially two steps, claim construc-
tion52 and claim application.53 Claim construction involves in-
46. Because Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 13184 (1996),
discussed many of the issues that this Note will address, albeit in a different con-
text, references to Markman will undergird much of the analysis.
47. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 617 (1950)
(Black, J., dissenting).
48. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §. 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries .... ").
49. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994). Although the patent is presumed to be valid, 5 DON-
ALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 19.01 (1995), the patentee nevertheless has the burden of
proving infringement, 4 id. § 18.06[1]. A prevailing patentee may be entitled to an
injunction, 35 U.S.C. § 283, and damages, Id. § 284, which can be trebled if the
infringement was willful, 5 CHISUM, supra, § 20.03[4].
50. See ROBERT L. HARMONY, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 6.1 (3d ed. 1994).
51. A patent comprises claims and a specification. See ROBERT P. MERGES, PAT-
ENT LAW AND POLICY 31 (1992). The claims set out the patented material and deter-
mine the metes and bounds of protection. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
116 S. Ct. 1384, 1387-88 (1996). The specification describes the invention and serves
as an aid in interpreting the claims. Id.
52. Charles Greiner & Co. v. Mari-Med Mfg., Inc., 962 F.2d 1031, 1034 (Fed.
Cir. 1992). In Markman, the Supreme Court held that claim construction is an issue
exclusively for the judge. 116 S. Ct. at 1395.
53. Charles Greiner, 962 F.2d at 1034. Infringement analysis focuses on the
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terpreting the individual terms used in the claims of the patent-
in-suit and then construing those claims to define the patent's
coverage." Claim application involves comparing the accused
device to the claims of the patent-in-suit in order to determine
whether the accused device falls within the scope of the patent's
claims."
Before determining whether an accused device infringes a
patented device under the doctrine of equivalents, a fact finder
first determines whether the accused device infringes literal-
ly.56 An accused device infringes literally when it contains each
element specified in the claims of the patent-in-suit.57 The
question of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents arises
when the accused device does not fall squarely within the
claim. 8 Although an accused device may not infringe a patent
literally, it may nevertheless infringe that patent under the
doctrine of equivalents if it performs substantially the same
function as the patented device in substantially the same way to
reach substantially the same result.59
A court-created animal"0 designed to deliver patentees from
patent's claims. Martin J. Adelman, The New World of Patents Created by the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 979, 994 (1987). Infringement
often arises from inadequate claim language, limited knowledge of existing technology,
and the "dynamic nature of technology." Id. As a result of new technology, ambiguities
in terminology cloud an understanding of what is the patented technology. Roy Collins
III, The Doctrine of Equivalents: Rethinking the Balance Between Equity and Predict-
ability, 22 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 285, 294 (1992) ("[Platent disputes ... are prone
to awkward semantic assessments and needlessly imprecise determinations of infringe-
ment."). Dispelling the ambiguities in terminology is a task more suited for the judi-
ciary than for the layman; claim construction invites a lawyerly mind to determine the
legal effect of the terms. See Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1395.
54. Charles Greiner, 962 F.2d at 1034.
55. Id.
56. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607
(1950).
57. Id. ("If accused matter falls clearly within the claim, infringement is made
out and that is the end of it.").
58. See Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607.
59. Id. at 608 (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42
(1929)). References to "substantiality" or "insubstantiality" in this Note connote appli-
cation of the function/way/result test. The logic of function/way/result also works in
reverse. The reverse doctrine of equivalents allows for a finding of noninfringement
when the accused device falls within the literal terms of the claims but does not
meet function/way/result requirements. Id. at 608-09.
60. Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 870 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("The doc-
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"the mercy of verbalism,"' the doctrine of equivalents first ap-
peared before the Supreme Court in 1853.62 A century later, the
Court's last pronouncement on the doctrine showed no significant
alterations in the analysis." The function/way/result test pro-
vides the basis for equivalency analysis and essentially has be-
come the sole determinant of infringement under the doctrine."
As the language of the function/way/result test suggests, in-
substantial differences between the patented and accused devic-
es form the touchstone of infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents.65 The patent system tolerates copying as long as
the intent is to design around the patent." In designing around
the patent, however, the competitor must ensure that his device
does more than just narrowly escape the expressed claim lan-
guage of the patent.6 ' The necessary amount of difference to
effectively design around patented devices should therefore be
the same as that which is necessary to avoid infringement.68
trine has been judicially devised to do equity' .... ") (emphasis added). Although Con-
gress has yet to codify the doctrine of equivalents, the Patent Act of 1952 did recognize
certain equivalents in means-plus-function language. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
61. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607.
62. Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853). Although not referred to
as the doctrine of equivalents, the principles underlying the doctrine had existed
since the original patent acts. See, e.g., Odiorne v. Winkley, 18 F. Cas. 581, 582
(C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No. 10,432) ("The material question... is ... whether the
given effect is produced substantially by the same mode of operation and the same
combination of powers ... ."); Gray v. James, 10 F. Cas. 1015, 1016 (C.C.D. Pa.
1817) (No. 5718) ("Where the machines are substantially the same, and operate in
the same manner to produce the same result, they must be in principle the same.").
63. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607 ("[Clourts have also recognized that to permit
imitation of a patented invention which does not copy every literal detail would be
to convert the protection of the patent grant into a hollow and useless thing.").
64. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1517-18
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (discussing the sufficiency of function/way/result to determine in-
fringement, but noting the applicability of other factors in the determination), cert.
granted, 116 S. Ct. 1014 (1996).
65. It is important to understand that, in extending patent coverage to devices
with merely insubstantial differences, the doctrine of equivalents does not enlarge
the claim. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677,
684 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 992 (1990). Rather, the doctrine "expands the
right to exclude [the manufacture, use, or sale of the patented device] to '.equivalents'
of what is claimed." Id.
66. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1520.
67. See Paul N. Katz, The Doctrine of Equivalents and Its Impact on "Designing
Around", 4 FED. Cm. B.J. 315, 315-16, 320-21 (1994).
68. Id. at 316; Keith A. Robb, Note, Hilton Davis and the Doctrine of Equiva-
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Two competing policies of the patent system tug at the doc-
trine of equivalents. Pulling in one direction is the notion that,
in order to create an economic incentive for technological devel-
opment, a patentee must have the protection of all that falls
within the scope of her patent.69 Pulling in the other direction,
however, is the notion that in order to encourage the develop-
ment of technology a competitor must have adequate notice of
what technology the patent embraces. 0 With adequate notice a
competitor can legally and effectively design around the patent
and thereby develop improvements in the art."' Without notice,
the competitor has no certain or predictable way to assess what
constitutes infringement, and, as a result, technological progress
suffers. 2  Absent specific judicial guidelines and accurate
claims, the doctrine of equivalents leaves a competitor without
that notice, and, as a result he is in a darkened room left to find
the bounds of liability by touch and guesswork alone.73
The doctrine of equivalents enables a patentee to protect her
invention more effectively. That protection, however, comes at
the competitor's expense. 4 Because the doctrine's very nature
introduces uncertainty into the question of infringement, an
lents-An Insubstantial Difference, 4 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 275, 282 (1996) (citing
London v. Carson Pixie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
69. Katz, supra note 67, at 315.
70. Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1542-43
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (Newman, J., dissenting); Katz, supra note 67, at 315-16; see also
Kurt L. Glitzenstein, A Normative and Positive Analysis of the Scope of the Doctrine
of Equivalents, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 281, 315-16 (1994) (arguing that material not
claimed in a patent is left to the public).
71. Katz, supra note 67, at 315-16.
72. Perkin-Elmer, 822 F.2d at 1543 ("If courts are not to hinder the progress of
technological advance, certainty and predictability are as important in the application
of equitable as of legal principles.").
73. "[A) 'zone of uncertainty which enterprise and experimentation may enter on-
ly at the risk of infringement claims would discourage invention only a little less
than unequivocal foreclosure of the field'." Markview v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
116 S. Ct. 1384, 1396 (1996) (quoting United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co.,
317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942) (discussing claim construction)).
74. Although the nature of the patent system may support giving the patentee
an advantage over the competitor, see Abolition, supra note 31, at 84-85, that advan-
tage should remain within the bounds of fairness, see Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v.
Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Nies, J., dissenting),
cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1014 (1996).
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effective and equitable patent system should only resort to
equivalency analysis in exceptional circumstances."5 Reliance
on the function/way/result formula, although an attractive salve,
has done little to provide the necessary level of certainty. Rath-
er, rotely employing a doctrine that was intended to remain free
from the trappings of formulaic and mechanistic application 6
has removed confidence and predictability in innovation."
The Role of Claims in Determining Infringement Under the
Doctrine of Equivalents
Now integral components of the patent system, claims origi-
nally were absent from patents." Formerly, a patent applicant
need only describe the invention in order to differentiate it suffi-
ciently from the prior art and thereby obtain a patent.79 Any
determination of infringement consequently hinged on the im-
permissible use of the "essence" of the patented device. 0
Equivalency-today the foundation of the doctrine of equivalents
exception-was originally the primary test for infringement,
much like literal infringement is the primary test today.8" A
75. London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991); cf
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 617 (1950) (Black,
J., dissenting) (noting that judicial expansion of a claim's language will lead to un-
certainty that will burden business).
76. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609.
77. Id. at 615-17 (Black, J., dissenting); London, 946 F.2d at 1538.
78. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (repealed 1793); Hilton Da-
vis, 62 F.3d at 1563-64 (Nies, J., dissenting); Paul C. Craane, Comment, At the
Boundaries of Law and Equity: The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the
Doctrine of Equivalents, 13 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 105, 133 n.161 (1992).
79. Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1020 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568);
Craane, supra note 78, at 133 n.161.
80. See Odiorne v. Winkley, 18 F. Cas. 581, 582 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No.
10,432); Gray v. James, 10 F. Cas. 1015, 1016 (C.C.D. Pa. 1817) (No. 5718); see also
Lowell, 15 F. Cas. at 1019-20 (holding that "a specific machine, substantially new in
its structure and mode of operation, and not merely changed in form, or in the
proportion of its parts" did not infringe).
81. See Odiorne, 18 F. Cas. at 582; Lowell, 15 F. Cas. at 1019-20; Gray, 10 F.
Cas. at 1016; Harold C. Wegner, Equitable Equivalents: Weighing the Equities to De-
termine Patent Infringement in Biotechnology and Other Emerging Technologies, 18
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 15-21 (1992); cf Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1564
(Nies, J., dissenting) (noting that the doctrine of equivalents first existed as a test of
validity).
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full understanding of the doctrine of equivalents therefore re-
quires an analysis of the historical role of patent claims.
In order to remove the burden of "ascertaining the exact in-
vention of the patentee by inference and conjecture"82 from the
courts, the Patent Act of 1 8 3 6 ' required the patentee to in-
clude claims that "particularly specify and point out the part,
improvement, or combination which he claims as his own inven-
tion or discovery."' The Act, however, did little to clarify in-
fringement analysis; patentees used the claims to define only the
invention's core attributes or essence. 5 These broadly termed
claims of "essence" provided no more clarification than did the
general specification." Equivalency analysis thus remained the
prevailing test for infringement."
Not until the Patent Act of 1870' did "peripheral claims"
replace central claims. 9 Peripheral claims defined the outer
limits, rather than the core, of the patent's coverage." Infringe-
ment analysis moved away from utilizing specification-based
equivalency and, instead, focused on claim-based literalness.9'
The doctrine of equivalents therefore took a secondary role in
infringement analysis, employed only when the equities of a par-
ticular case required an equivalency test.92
82. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1539 (Plager, J., dissenting) (quoting Keystone
Bridge Co. v. Phoenix Iron Co., 95 U.S. 274, 278 (1877)).
83. Ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (repealed 1870).
84. § 6, 5 Stat. at 119; see also Craane, supra note 78, at 133 n.161 (asserting
that under the Patent Act of 1790 patents were valueless because of the cost of pri-
vate inquiry into validity). The Patent Act of 1836 further required that the appli-
cant "fully explain the principle and the several modes in which he has contemplat-
ed the application of that principle or character by which it may be distinguished
from other inventions." § 6, 5 Stat. at 119.
85. See RDsDALE ELLIS, PATENT CLAIMS §§ 4-6 (1949). This method of claiming
an invention's core attributes is called "central claiming" and allows for no limitation
on the scope of protection.
86. Ronald D. Hantman, Doctrine of Equivalents, 70 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
Soc'Y 511, 516-17 (1988).
87. See Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 344 (1853).
88. Ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 (repealed 1952).
89. Id. § 26; Wegner, supra note 81, at 18-21.
90. Wegner, supra note 81, at 19.
91. Id.
92. Id.; see Collins, supra note 53, at 298. Congress passed the Patent Act of
1952 soon after the decision in Graver Tank. 35 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). Although the Act
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The Graver Tank Precedent
Decided over forty-five years ago, Graver Tank & Manufactur-
ing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co.93 is the Supreme Court's most
recent pronouncement on the doctrine of equivalents. In deciding
that the defendant's welding flux device infringed the patentee's
device," the Court emphasized the importance of halting the
"unscrupulous copyist" who might otherwise bypass the literal
language of the patent's claims,95 and the use of the func-
tion/way/result test under the "proper circumstances.""6 The
Court further emphasized the doctrine's equitable nature, stat-
ing that "[w]hat constitutes equivalency must be determined
against the context of the patent, the prior art, and the particu-
lar circumstances of the case."97
does not provide for analysis under the doctrine of equivalents, it does recognize
equivalents as they pertain to claims written in "means-plus-function" language. Id.
§ 112. The revised act provides that:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means
or step for performing a specified function without the recital of
structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be
construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described
in the specification and equivalents thereof.
Id. (emphasis added). A "means-plus-function" claim would allow a patentee to re-
place "standard" claim language, such as "chair" with broader language, such as "a
means for sitting." See id. Highly common today, means-plus-function language has
increased the difficulty in defining the scope of the doctrine of equivalents. Collins,
supra note 53, at 296.
Determining equivalency under section 112--equivalency for use in literal analy-
sis-is distinct, however, from determining equivalency for use in doctrine of equiva-
lents analysis. Id. Section 112 equivalency requires that the structure in the accused
device be the same or equivalent and perform the identical functions as disclosed in
the patent specification, whereas analysis under the doctrine of equivalents requires
application of the function/way/result test. Id. at 297-300. The operative difference in
equivalency is that these claims limit the patentee's range of equivalency, whereas
the doctrine of equivalents expands the patentee's range. Valmont Indus., Inc. v.
Reinke Mfg. Co., 983 F.2d 1039, 1042-44 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing Johnston v. IVAC
Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989)); Collins, supra note 53, at 297-300.
93. 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
94. The defendant substituted in its flux a nonalkaline earth metal, manganese,
for the patentee's alkaline earth metal, magnesium. Id. at 610. This substitution was
the sole difference between the two versions of flux. Id.
95. Id. at 607.
96. Id. at 608.
97. Id. at 609.
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Stating that the determination of equivalence is a question of
fact, the Court went on to hold that the credibility of evidence
supporting equivalency "is to be decided by the trial court....
Particularly is this so in a field where so much depends upon
familiarity with specific scientific problems and principles not
usually contained in the general storehouse of knowledge and
experience."9 ' The Court's characterization of equivalency as a
factual issue does seem to suggest the propriety of a jury, as
used in literal infringement cases." The Court's finding that
the trial court should decide the issue of equivalency, however,
supports an ultimately contrary belief in the impropriety of
using a jury to determine equivalency.' 0
Taking its cue from copyright law, the Court further differen-
tiated the nature of equivalency analysis from that of literal
analysis by emphasizing the infringer's intent. Stating that
"[o]ne who seeks to pirate an invention, like one who seeks to
pirate a copyrighted book or play, may be expected to introduce
minor variations to conceal and shelter the piracy,"'' the
Court, throughout its opinion, referred to the doctrine of equiva-
lents as a tool to combat various manifestations of intent.0 2
Typically, patent theory only considers a defendant's intent
when determining whether to award treble damages.0 3 With-
out explicitly holding so, the Court forcefully suggested that, in
the equitable realm of the doctrine of equivalents, intent is de-
terminative.
98. Id. at 610 (emphasis added).
99. Id.
100. Graver Tank was tried to the bench. Id. at 611.
101. Id. at 607 (emphasis added to highlight the Court's focus on intent). Judge
Learned Hand described infringement under a copyright theory: "[Jiust as [the copy-
right owner] is no less an 'author' because others have preceded him, so another
who follows him, is not a tort-feasor unless he pirates his work." Sheldon v. Metro-
Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936).
102. The Court employed such terms as "unscrupulous copyist," "pirate," "fraud,"
"stealing," 'conceal," and "imitation." Graver Tank, 339 U.S at 607-08.
103. See 5 CHISUM, supra note 49, § 20.03[4]. Additionally, patent theory does not
account for "look and feel" comparisons between devices. See Martin J. Adehnan &
Gary L. Francione, The Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Law: Questions That
Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 703 (1989). Copyright theory,
however, does employ "look and feel" comparisons and considers intent when making
those comparisons. See id.
332 [Vol. 38:319
DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
In addition to the consideration of intent, the lack of proper
notice also highlights the doctrine's departure from traditional
patent theory. In his dissent to the finding of infringement,
Justice Black argued the need for adequate notice through the
use of clear claim language and warned of the future implica-
tions of the majority's holding."'4 In light of the realization of
Justice Black's fears, courts should apply the doctrine of equiva-
lents in exceptional cases only and should bring the doctrine in
line with the reissue process.' °
The Federal Circuit and Its Modern Doctrine of Equivalents
Pursuant to the Federal Courts Improvements Act of
1982,106 Congress established the Federal Circuit in order to
"improve the uniformity of patent decisions and the stability of
patent law.""07 Since then, the Federal Circuit has become es-
sentially the court of last resort in patent cases."0 8 In large
part, the Federal Circuit has fulfilled this role.0 9 With respect
to the doctrine of equivalents, however, the Federal Circuit has
yet to establish either a consistent or an effective approach."0
The Federal Circuit, however, has set out general attributes of
the doctrine that govern its application today. With its focus still
on the claims and their limitations,"' the doctrine of equiva-
104. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 614-16 (Black, J., dissenting).
105. Id. (Black, J., dissenting). The reissue process allows patentees, within a
period of time, to amend their claims after the patent has issued; the process also
protects competitors for actions taken between the original issue and reissue dates.
See infra notes 318-22 and accompanying text.
106. Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1994)).
107. John B. Pegram, Should the U.S. Court of International Trade Be Given Pat-
ent Jurisdiction Concurrent with That of the District Courts?, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 67,
85-86 (citing S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1981), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15).
108. Rudolph P. Hofmann Jr., The Doctrine of Equivalents: Twelve Years of Feder-
al Circuit Precedent Still Leaves Practitioners Wondering, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1033, 1034 (1994); see, e.g., Robert Desmond, Comment, Nothing Seems "Obvious" to
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: The Federal Circuit, Unchecked by the
Supreme Court, Transforms the Standard of Obviousness Under the Patent Law, 26
LOY. LAL L. REV. 455, 455 (1993) ("The Supreme Court has remained silent while
the [Federal Circuit] has boldly redefined the criteria used to determine whether an
invention is patentable under the patent law.").
109. See Merz & Pace, supra note 30, at 579.
110. Collins, supra note 53, at 285-86.
111. Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1533 n.9
1996] 333
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:319
lents requires the patentee to show particularized evidence of
insubstantial differences between the patented and accused
devices." 2 An accused device must contain every limitation (or
element), or equivalent thereof, found in every claim of the pat-
ent in order to infringe that patent."1 This "all elements" anal-
ysis therefore compares the accused device to the patented de-
vice element-by-element."
Before comparing elements, however, courts must first deter-
mine the appropriate scope of equivalency to apply to each
claim."5 In doing so, courts consider whether the patented in-
vention is a pioneer in its art, a marked improvement, or a nar-
row improvement."6 Knowledge of forthcoming technology is
unsure; claims for pioneer inventions therefore receive a greater
scope of equivalency than do claims for inventions in a crowded
art."'17 Marked improvements receive a "substantial range of
equivalents," while narrow improvements receive only a limited
range of equivalents, if any at all."' Moreover, where the
(Fed. Cir. 1987). Defining the scope of equivalency for each claim is a matter of law
for the judge. Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 333-34 (1853); Texas
Instruments Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 988 F.2d 1165, 1173 (Fed.
Cir. 1993).
A limitation, or element, in a patent claim reduces the scope of the claim. 5
CHISUM, supra note 49, § 18.0314]. The limitation enables the patent applicant to
obtain a patent by removing material that would either encompass prior art or
would otherwise infringe on another patent. Id.
112. Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Sealy Mattress Co., 873 F.2d 1422, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
113. London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(citing Lemelson v. United States, 752 F.2d 1538, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1985)); Pennwalt
Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 935 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (citing Perkin-
Elmer, 822 F.2d at 1532-33).
114. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 935. But see Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d
861, 871 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting the appropriateness of considering whether the ac-
cused device "may be using the most important aspect if not the gist of the [plaintiff's]
inventions"); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1364-66 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (employing an "equivalenc6 as a whole" analysis). Donald Chisum provides an
explanation for the divergent approaches; he distinguishes between comparing the
actual manifestations of the devices as a whole and comparing the claimed subject
matter to the accused device as a whole. 5 CHISUM, supra note 49, § 18.041l][b].
115. 5 CHISUM, supra note 49, § 18.04121.
116. Id. § 18.04[21[a].
117. Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Litton Sys., Inc., 720 F.2d 1572, 1580 (Fed. Cir.
1983).
118. 5 CHISUM; supra note 49, § 18.04[21[a].
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claims designate a specific value as necessary for the invention
to function, a court may allow no equivalency.' 9
Additional limitations found in a patent's prior art, context,
and prosecution history can defeat the application of the
doctrine of equivalents."'2 Equivalents to claims in a patent
cannot cover technology that was known before the patent is-
sued.'2 ' The boundary of equivalency extends only as far as the
prior art-that technology already present in the public do-
main-allows.'22 If the prior art discloses the accused device,
then no infringement exists."
A patent's context also plays an important role in determining
infringement.'" Courts therefore look to the purpose of each
claim and its elements, as well as to the interchangeability of
claimed and unclaimed "ingredients" by a person skilled in the
art to ensure that the patentee has not claimed matter beyond
that which she disclosed.'2
Similarly, the prosecution' 26 history of a patent can also es-
top application of the doctrine of equivalents. 2' Essentially,
the patentee cannot reclaim in litigation what she surrendered
during prosecution." If, in asserting infringement, the paten-
tee points to material in the accused device that she sacrificed in
order to secure her patent, then no infringement exists. 29
These limitations, in conjunction with the "all-elements" ap-
proach, helped to rein in the doctrinb of equivalents.'30 Enter
119. Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573, 1582-84 (Fed.
Cir. 1996).
120. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950).
121. See Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677,
683 (Fed. Cir.) (holding that a determination whether prior art covers a particular
device is a matter of law) (citing Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861 (Fed.
Cir. 1985)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 992 (1990).
122. Id. at 684.
123. Id. at 683.
124. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609.
125. Id.
126. In patent law, "prosecution" refers to the process of obtaining a patent.
MERGES, supra note 51, at 30. "Litigation," or asserting a patent, refers to the pro-
cess of enforcing a patentee's rights of exclusion. RICHARD T. HOLZMANN, INFRINGE-
MENT OF THE UNITED STATES PATENT RIGHT 1 (1995).
127. 5 CHISUM, supra note 49, § 18.05.
128. Id. §§ 18.05, 18.0513].
129. Id. § 18.05.
130. See Thomas K. Landry, Certainty and Discretion in Patent Law: The On Sale
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Hilton Davis.
Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co.131
Hilton Davis is notable more for what it failed to do than for
what it actually accomplished. 13 2 Although the Federal Circuit
has attempted in the past to equalize the positions of the paten-
tee and the defendant, 13  its decision in Hilton Davis repre-
sents a return to the doctrine's roots"s and, consequently, a
skewing of positions in favor of the patentee.
The controversy in Hilton Davis centered on a process for
filtering dyes called "ultrafiltration."35 An improvement over a
traditional method called "salting out," ultrafiltration employs
osmosis to separate manufacturing by-products from the dye
through a membrane.1 36 Hilton Davis and Warner-Jenkinson,
both dye manufacturers, developed independently their own
versions of ultrafiltration.3 7 Although Warner-Jenkinson test-
ed its process one week before Hilton Davis did in 1982, Hilton
Davis was first to produce a successful process and obtained the
patent-in-suit for that process.1 38 In order to secure its patent,
however, Hilton Davis limited the claims for its ultrafiltration
process to specific pressures of 200-400 p.s.i.g., pHs of 6.0 to 9.0,
and pore diameters of five to fifteen Angstroms." 9
Bar, the Doctrine of Equivalents, and Judicial Power in the Federal Circuit, 67 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1193-94 (1994).
131. 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1014 (1996).
132. In this way, Hilton Davis is what it purported to be: a restatement, rather
than a revision, of the doctrine of equivalents.
133. See, eg., Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1009 (1988); Landry, supra note 130, at 1196.
134. See Gary M. Hoffman & Eric Oliver, With Hilton Davis the Federal Circuit
Takes the Doctrine of Equivalents Back to Its Roots, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 181 (1996).
135. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1515.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1515-16.
138. Id. Both Hilton Davis and Warner-Jenkinson unknowingly hired Osmonics,
Inc., a manufacturer of filtration equipment, to conduct their tests. Id. at 1516.
139. Id. In order to avoid estoppel by prior art, Hilton Davis amended its original
Claim 1 to encompass only such processes operating "at a pH from approximately
6.0 to 9.0." Id. at 1515-16. A prior patent disclosed an ultrafiltration process operat-
ing at a pH above 9.0 and "preferably between 11 and 13." Id. at 1516.
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Warner-Jenkinson did not make its process known to the
public until 1986, after Hilton Davis had already introduced its
process commercially. 4 ° Warner-Jenkinson's version of ultrafil-
tration operated at pressures of 200-500 p.s.i.g. and at a pH of
5.0.'4' Despite the fact that the two processes functioned under
different specifications, Hilton Davis sued Warner-Jenkinson in
1991 for patent infringement.' The case went to a jury,
which found that Warner-Jenkinson had not infringed literal-
ly."4 The jury did, however, find infringement under the doc-
trine of equivalents but declined to award treble damages for
willful infringement.' Warner-Jenkinson appealed on the is-
sues of infringement and validity,'45 and after hearing oral ar-
guments in 1993, the Federal Circuit decided to rehear the ap-
peal en banc." 6 The court called for briefs discussing three is-
sues: (1) whether infringement under the doctrine of equivalents
requires more than insubstantiality of differences, (2) whether
the issue of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is an
equitable remedy for the court to decide, and (3) whether appli-
cation of the doctrine of equivalents is discretionary when no
literal infringement exists."
Without explicitly overruling or modifying any precedent, "
the majority found that (1) although a court may consider addi-
tional factors (excluding intent), insubstantial differences be-
tween the processes alone may suffice for a finding of infringe-
ment,49 (2) infringement under the doctrine of equivalents was
140. Id. Shortly after introducing its own ultrafiltration process, Warner-Jenkinson
discovered the existence of the Hilton Davis process. Id. Hilton Davis did not learn
of the Warner-Jenkinson process until 1989. Id.
141. Id. No actual pore diameters for Warner-Jenkinson's membrane were present-
ed at trial, although experts testified that the membrane "would have a nominal
pore diameter of 5 to 15 Angstroms." Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. The jury awarded Hilton Davis only 20% of the requested damages, but
the judge granted a permanent injunction prohibiting Warner-Jenldnson from using
its process at pressures below 500 p.s.i.g. and pHs below 9.01. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Hoffman & Oliver, supra note 29, at 19.
149. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1518.
19961 337
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
not an equitable issue for the court to decide in a jury trial,150
(3) application of the doctrine of equivalents was not discretion-
ary when there was no literal infringement, 5' and (4) substan-
tial evidence of equivalency between the Hilton Davis and
Warner-Jenkinson processes existed.'52
The decision in Hilton Davis stressed the importance of objec-
tivity in applying the doctrine of equivalents, especially regard-
ing the substantiality of differences and the interchangeability of
the accused elements with the patented elements.'53 The Fed-
eral Circuit purposefully drew short of adopting insubstantiality
of differences as the sole test of infringement under the doctrine
of equivalents, thereby allowing consideration of other factors
that could provide an objective assessment of infringement.'4
For example, the court was willing to consider factors such as
the defendant's efforts to design around the patent-in-suit.'
The majority attached no weight, however, to the defendant's
intent to infringe, 55 even though the purpose of the doctrine is
to curb piracy. Stating that the doctrine of equivalents is not
limited to cases of "unscrupulous copy[ing]"' 5 ' and that intent
to copy is not an element of patent infringement generally, the
Federal Circuit held that intent is only a concern with respect to
treble damages."'
The court held that copying is relevant under the doctrine
only to the extent that it indicates whether the defendant has
made substantial changes in his product.'59 Designing around
a patent, however, has greater relevance to equivalency analysis
in that, being "the stuff of ... competition[,]" it is technologically
and economically desirable.6 The accused infringer who can
150. Id. at 1520-22.
151. Id. at 1522.
152. Id. at 1524.
153. Id. at 1517-22.
154. Id. at 1518.
155. Id. at 1519-20.
156. Id. at 1519.
157. Id. (quoting Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605,
607 (1950)).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1520 (quoting State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226,
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show evidence of designing around the patented device has dealt
a heavy blow to the patentee's case.' 6' Independent develop-
ment-i.e., lacking sufficient knowledge of the earlier device to
qualify as designing around-is only relevant indirectly.'62
Other factors, the court reasoned, also may be relevant to the
question of infringement, but no factors beyond insubstantiality
are necessary to determine infringement."
The Federal Circuit also took a limited view of the doctrine's
equitable nature, stating that a simple reference to a body of
precedent as "equitable" does not require exclusive review by a
chancellor.' When the term "equity" is meant only as a syn-
onym for what is fair and just, it does not necessarily mandate
procedures such as trial without a jury."
Construing Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air
Products Co.'66 to mean that the doctrine of equivalents exists
only to preserve fair protection of a patentee's rights, the majori-
ty in Hilton Davis further argued that, because all infringement
is a matter of fact, the doctrine of equivalents is triable to a
jury."' The majority also relied on the fact that Graver Tank
did not discuss the doctrine as a matter for a chancellor as fur-
ther support for its view that doctrine of equivalents cases war-
rant juries." The majority failed to point out, however, that
Graver Tank was a bench trial and therefore required no special
discussion of chancellors.'69 The Supreme Court in Graver
Tank actually had stated that the determination of equivalence
was best suited for the judge, who possessed the necessary
1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1518.
164. Id. at 1521; 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGE-EQUrT-RESTrrU-
TION § 2.1(3) (2d ed. 1993). "[Iun a case that is tried to a jury as a 'law' case,
[however,] the judge might still make important decisions turn on equitable estoppel
or other equity doctrines." Id. "Chancellor" refers to a judge sitting in equity. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 231 (6th ed. 1990).
165. 1 DOBBS, supra note 164, § 2.1(3).
166. 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
167. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1520-21. The implication is that no issue of fact can
be an issue of equity. See id. at 1541 (Plager, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 1521.
169. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 611.
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knowledge and experience.' ° Furthermore, although the ma-
jority in Hilton Davis insisted that "Graver Tank [did] not dis-
cuss any of the principles commonly attending the chancellor's
invocation of equitable power, such as... the mandatory bal-
ancing of the equities," 7' Graver Tank, in fact, required that
"equivalency must be determined against... the particular
circumstances of the case" and that the judge should weigh the
factors to determine equivalency.'72 Although one might argue
that the Supreme Court placed responsibility for equivalency
determination with the judge simply because Graver Tank was a
bench trial, the language surrounding the passage strongly sug-
gests that the Supreme Court specifically intended to extend the
judge's responsibility to trials where juries had decided the issue
of literal infringement as well.'73
The majority also removed from the judge any discretion re-
garding the applicability of the doctrine of equivalents to a par-
ticular case.74 The doctrine of equivalents has always been
available to the patentee, argued the majority, and Supreme
Court cases on the doctrine have established firmly that applica-
tion of the doctrine is not discretionary.'75 Still, prosecution
history estoppel and restrictive claiming can preclude applica-
tion of the doctrine.'76
The Concurrence and Dissents: Illustrations of the Current
Debate
Representative of the current debate surrounding the doctrine
of equivalents, the concurrence and dissents in Hilton Davis dis-
cussed the doctrine's place and usefulness in infringement anal-
ysis, as well as the proper role of juries in equivalency analy-
sis. '7 Though concurring with the majority, Judge Newman
170. Id. at 610.
171. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1521.
172. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609-10.
173. See id.
174. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1522.
175. Id. at 1521.
176. See, e.g., Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573, 1581-
84 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Mark I Mktg. Corp. v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 66 F.3d 285,
291 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 917 (1996).
177. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1529-83 (Newman, J., concurring; Plager, J., dis-
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nevertheless expressed her doubts about the usefulness of the
doctrine of equivalents," commenting that "[tihe uncertainty
in judicial application of the [doctrine of equivalents] surely
serves the patentee, perhaps disproportionately."" 9 Newman's
comment illustrates the advantage that patentees enjoy in doc-
trine of equivalents cases and the difficulty in applying a doc-
trine that allows little, if any, notice as to what acts will consti-
tute infringement.
Focusing on the role of juries rather than the adequacy of
notice, Judge Plager argued in his dissent that putting the doc-
trine of equivalents to a jury is "operationally unsatisfactory and
jurisprudentially unjustified,"' and that both history and the
public interest support the purely equitable nature of the doc-
trine of equivalents.' 8' In agreeing with Judge Plager that the
doctrine of equivalents is a matter for the judge, not the ju-
ry, 82 Judge Lourie noted that although no modern Supreme
Court ruling governs the issue of judge/jury roles in equivalency
analysis," the doctrine's historical function of weighing vari-
ous factors is an equitable determination and more a job for a
senting; Lourie, J., dissenting; Nies, J., dissenting).
178. The doctrine of equivalents has become increasingly complex because techno-
logical progress occurs from both the "originators" of concepts and from "those who
improve, enlarge, and challenge" concepts. Id. at 1531-32 (Newman, J., concurring).
179. Id. at 1534 (Newman, J., concurring). Judge Newman did postulate that the
lack of certainty of a patent's coverage could cause "leapfrogging" in technological de-
velopment rather than advancing technology one minor improvement at a time. Id.
at 1532-33 (Newman, J., concurring).
180. Id. at 1542 (Plager, J., dissenting). "[Jiudges bear the responsibility of ensur-
ing that, when the claims being urged are not based on clearly defined rights, the
balance that is struck is struck in the public interest." Id. at 1545 (Plager, J., dis-
senting).
181. Id. at 1539-43 (Plager, J., dissenting). Judge Plager argued further that:
[Wlhen there is a wrong for which there is no adequate remedy at law,
equity courts have traditionally gone beyond the law to impose a just
and equitable result. Thus in those special cases in which the
competitor's product is literally different but the difference is so insub-
stantial as to constitute a "fraud on the patent," a cairt in the exercise
of its extraordinary equity power may extend the remedy of infringement
in order to protect the rights of the patentee granted by law. •
Id. at 1540 (Plager, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 1549 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
183. Id. (Lourie, J., dissenting).
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judge than a question for the jury."' Judge Nies's dissent of-
fered different reasoning for the inappropriateness of juries in
determining infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.'85
Although she approached the doctrine as a mixed question of
law and fact,8 ' Judge Nies argued that infringement analysis
resolves itself into a question of law for the bench after the
claims have been interpreted and the elements of the accused
device determined.'87 Furthermore the current state of the doc-
trine, argued Judge Nies, makes equivalency analysis by a jury
ineffective."
Judge Plager suggested that a proper solution for the jury
problem would be either to remove the doctrine of equivalents
from jury consideration altogether or to have the judge and jury
share responsibility for applying the doctrine.'89 In sharing re-
sponsibilities, trial judges, with proper guidance from the Fed-
eral Circuit, would determine when insubstantiality and "cir-
cumstances so sufficiently special"'" exist such that analysis
under the doctrine of equivalents is warranted. 9' The jury
would then apply the function/way/result test and determine as
a matter of fact whether the accused device infringes. 92 Such
an arrangement would strike a balance between the discretion
of the bench and the historical role of the jury in determining
infringement by equivalency.'93 Judge Lourie suggested a simi-
lar allocation of duties."M He contemplated giving the relevant
factors surrounding the alleged infringement to the jury for
factual determination and then having the judge weigh those
184. Id. (Lourie, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 1550-83 (Nies, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 1550 (Nies, J., dissenting).
187. Id. (Nies, J., dissenting). Judge Nies also presented an historical analysis,
concluding that "in a jury case, proper instructions must identify factual issues and
legal limitations on finding equivalency." See id. at 1579 (Nies, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 1563 (Nies, J., dissenting) ("We have made the infringement analysis
so convoluted it is impossible for most district court judges untrained in 'patentese'
to follow, much less jurors.").
189. Id. at 1543-44 (Plager, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 1543 (Plager, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 1543-44 (Plager, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 1544 (Plager, J., dissenting).
193. Id. (Plager, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 1550 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
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factors equitably.'95
To Judge Lourie, consideration of factors beyond the func-
tion/way/result test were vital to a proper and fair application of
the doctrine of equivalents.'96 Arguing that the majority inter-
preted Graver Tank incorrectly,'97 Lourie contended that the
Supreme Court did not hold that insubstantiality alone consti-
tuted infringement.19 Other factors were also deemed relevant,
such as whether (1) the patented invention was a pioneer in its
field, (2) the defendant developed its product through indepen-
dent research or through imitation, (3) those skilled in the art
considered the patented and accused elements interchangeable,
(4) the patentee sought reissue, and (5) the patentee's behavior
hindered the public's reasonable understanding of the scope of
the claims."
Furthermore, according to Judge Lourie, consideration of
intent is critical. 2' Lourie argued that the fact that intent is
irrelevant in determining literal infringement does not render
intent meaningless in determining equivalency infringement.20 '
The doctrine of equivalents exists to frustrate piracy; without
consideration of the defendant's intent to pirate the patented
invention, the doctrine of equivalents would ensnare devices
that are undeserving of equivalency analysis. 202 "The whole
tenor of Graver Tank is to make that distinction" between in-
tended and unwitting infringement.0 3
That distinction is essential to a fair legal analysis, and a fair
legal analysis is essential to the survival of the doctrine of
equivalents; ultimately, "[i]f we are to persist in an extra-statu-
tory remedy, it should be as fair to both sides as that provided in
the statute."2 c4 The doctrine of equivalents, as" defined by the
195. Id. (Laurie, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 1547 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
197. Id. (Lourie, J., dissenting).
198. Id. (Lourie, J., dissenting).
199. Id. (Lourie, J., dissenting).
200. Id. at 1547-48 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
201. See id. at 1547 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 1548 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
203. Id. (Lourie, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 1560 (Nies, J., dissenting).
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majority in Hilton Davis, is "wholly arbitrary""5 and removes
the public's protection from "unknowable infringement."0 6 At
the same time, the doctrine provides the patentee with an at-
tractive alternative to pursuing reissue to correct her claims and
"is as unfair as broadened reissues of a patent without interven-
ing rights."2 7
The concurrence and dissents brought out aspects of the doc-
trine of equivalents that the majority failed to address effective-
ly. The inherent uncertainty in the doctrine undermines its
usefulness and provides the patentee an unfair advantage over
competitors. Lack of appreciation for the doctrine's history fur-
ther benefits the patentee by encouraging neglect of the histori-
cally appropriate and effective roles of the judge and jury. Addi-
tionally, ignoring the defendant's intent bypasses the equitable
principles that support the doctrine.
The Error of Hilton Davis
The Federal Circuit's approach to the doctrine of equivalents
in Hilton Davis appears to be an attempt to balance certainty
with fairness in a jury trial. Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit's
attempt accomplished neither certainty nor fairness. 2°' For all
practical purposes notice remains insufficient. Furthermore, the
sense of fairness that the court touched on in Pennwalt Corp. v.
Durand-Wayland, Inc.20 1 subsequently has disappeared
through the court's refusal to consider fully the role of intent,
the impropriety of juries in equivalency analysis, and the unfair
effects that jury miscomprehension and bias have on a defen-
dant in doctrine of equivalents litigation. Moreover, the Federal
Circuit's failure to "specify by name any prior precedent that
would be overruled, modified, or in any way affected by their
ruling, [has left] litigants.., to their own devices to ascertain
what precedent can still be relied upon and what precedent is
205. Id. at 1562 (Nies, J., dissenting).
206. Id. (Nies, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 1560 (Nies, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 318-22 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the reissue process).
208. See Bryan Collins, Updates in Science and Technology: Hilton Davis Chemical
Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 2 B.U. J. SC. & TECH. L. 4, 17 (1996).
209. 883 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1009 (1988); see supra note 35.
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effectively overruled by Hilton Davis."21
Equity As Pure Equity11
The Historical Nature of the Doctrine
In reaching its decision, the Federal Circuit failed to appreci-
ate fully the history and equitable nature of equivalency analy-
sis. Though decided after Hilton Davis, Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc. recognized the role of history in attempting "to
classify a mongrel practice," and noted the ability of a court to
parse an equitable issue from a larger issue for independent
review.2 " Had the Federal Circuit attached similar weight to
the history of the doctrine of equivalents, it might well have
decided differently the roles of the jury and intent. The majority
in Hilton Davis maintained instead that the factual nature of
the doctrine of equivalents mandated jury review where the
plaintiff requested one.213
In 1791, suits for patent infringement were actions on the
case214 and therefore warranted juries.215 Equivalency analy-
sis, at that time the only viable test for infringement, was there-
fore subject to a jury trial.216 Indeed, the fact that juries re-
viewed many of the earliest cases involving equivalency analysis
supports the majority's view.217 That support diminishes, how-
210. Hoffman & Oliver, supra note 29, at 19.
211. See supra note 9.
212. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1389-90, 1396
(1996).
213. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1521 (Fed.
Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1014 (1996).
214. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 4, 1 Stat. 109, 111 (repealed 1793). The term
"actions on the case" refers to actions founded on the common law or upon acts of
the legislature. 1 JOSEPH CB=1TY, A TREATISE ON PLEADING 131 (Springfield, Mass.,
G. & C. Merriman 15th ed. 1859).
215. 1 CHITrY, supra note 214, at 131; Patrick Devlin, Jury Trial of Complex Cas-
es: English Practice and the Time of the Seventh Amendment, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 43,
44 (1980). "Thus, patent litigation in that early period was typified by so-called
novelty actions, testing whether 'any essential part of [the patent had been] dis-
closed to the public before,'" and "enablement' cases, in which juries were asked to
determine whether the specification described the invention well enough to allow
members of the appropriate trade to reproduce it ... Markman, 116 S. Ct. at
1390-91 (citations omitted).
216. See Amberg Brief, supra note 9, at 361.
217. See, e.g., Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853); Odiorne v.
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ever, when one considers that the early patent acts required
only vague descriptions of the invention claimed.218 Such vague
descriptions could not accommodate the test for literal infringe-
ment as it is known today. Equivalency thus served as the pri-
mary test for infringement in the early cases and, under the
early acts, was a jury issue.219 With the advent of modern
claiming methods, the doctrine of equivalents underwent a criti-
cal change in its application and is now used solely in an equita-
ble capacity. °
Recognizing the faults of equivalency analysis, Congress effec-
tively removed equivalency from statutory infringement.22' The
requirement of peripheral claiming shifted focus from the central
nature of an invention to the outer limit of the protection
sought.22 2 The Patent Act of 187021 thus removed the need to
determine infringement by equivalency unless the particular
equities so required." Instead, literal infringement analysis
came to the fore as the method best suited for determining in-
fringement.2  Infringement generally remains triable to a jury
today, but the right to a jury should extend no further than
literal analysis. When an action invokes the doctrine of equiva-
lents, the analysis enters the realm of equity where use of a jury
no longer applies.2
Winkley, 18 F. Cas. 581 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No. 10,432); Gray v. James, 10 F. Cas.
1015 (C.C.D. Pa. 1817) (No. 5718); Charles W. Bradley, The Changing Role of Juries
in Patent Litigation, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW INSTITUTE 1995, at 113, 155
n.1 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Property Course Handbook Se-
ries No. G-416, 1995).
218. See supra notes 78-87 and accompanying text; see also Markman, 116 S. Ct.
at 1391 & n.6 (describing the discontent with the "amorphous character" of patent
law in England and quoting Chief Justice Eyre in Boulton & Watt v. Bull, 2 H. Bl.
463, 491, 126 Eng. Rep. 651, 665 (C.P. 1795), who said that p]atent rights are no
where that I can find accurately discussed in our books").
219. Cf. Collins, supra note 53, at 287 ("ITihe early standard of infringement was
essentially the doctrine of equivalents as a matter of law, rather than equity.").
220. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1539-40
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (Plager, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1014 (1996); Federal
Circuit Bar Brief, supra note 9, at 355-56.
221. See Wegner, supra note 81, at 19.
222. Id.
223. Ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 (repealed 1952).
224. See Collins, supra note 53, at 288; Wegner, supra note 81, at 19.
225. See Wegner, supra note 81, at 19.
226. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1542-43
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Although infringement by equivalency was triable to a jury
originally, that fact alone should not serve as a basis for requir-
ing juries in today's doctrine of equivalents cases. A fundamen-
tal change in the patent system, the replacement of equivalency
analysis with literal analysis,227 illustrates recognition of the
inherent problems of equivalency analysis. Maintaining the "tra-
dition" of juries'in doctrine of equivalents cases may undermine
the changes in the patent system more than it furthers
them.22 Juries were present in the early equivalency analysis
simply because patent cases warranted juries, and equivalency
analysis was the only test available. The switch to literal analy-
sis as the primary test represented a recognition of the faults of
equivalency analysis229 and the problems with placing equiva-
lency analysis in the hands of the jury.
In addition to the historical development of the doctrine of
equivalents, many commentators point to the law of contracts as
a basis for the pure equity nature of the doctrine." Consider-
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (Plager, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1014 (1996); id. at
1549 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
227. See Robert M. Meeks, Metaphors of Infringement and Equivalence: The Solu-
tion of Our Problems, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 279, 283-92 (1994).
228. See Wegner, supra note 81, at 18-19. Oversight and blind adherence to tradi-
tion could explain the fact that juries have remained present in doctrine of equiva-
lents cases since the institution of peripheral claiming. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at
1542-43 (Plager, J., dissenting). Moreover, the pro-defendant atmosphere of patent
litigation prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit could also explain why a defen-
dant might not object to the few instances of trial by jury. Cf Abolition, supra note
31, at 84 (describing the hardships that faced the patentee before the arrival of the
Federal Circuit).
229. Wegner, supra note 81, at 18-19.
230. See, e.g., Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1563-83 (Nies, J., dissenting); Amberg
Brief, supra note 9, at 357. Mr. Amberg presents the contract argument:
[T]he contract-the patent's written claims-is deemed accurately to re-
flect the written meeting of the minds of the [Patent] Office and the
applicant. The written claims are submitted by the applicant, who may
be assumed to have employed words accurately reflecting his or her then-
existing state of mind. If the Office examiner allows the claims, it is pre-
sumed that he or she read and understood the claims and agreed to the
written claims as accurately conforming to the examiner's state of mind
as to what was allowable subject matter under the applicable statutory
criteria.... Thus, upon allowance of the written claims, there was a
meeting of the minds, an agreement, that was accurately expressed in
the words of those claims. A later reformation-expansion of the expressed
words of the claims to conform to an unexpressed intent, or change of
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ing a patent to be a contract between the patentee and the gov-
ernment, those commentators view the doctrine of equivalents
as a tool for reforming the patent contract.231 When literal
analysis failed to produce a fair result, the courts resorted to the
original equivalency analysis .1 2 In this way, the courts essen-
tially reformed the claims, much as a court would reform the
terms of a contract. 3 Viewed as a method of contract reforma-
tion, which is a matter for the judge, 4 the doctrine of equiva-
lents is then an equitable issue for the judge to decide, even
though it rests within the legal action of infringement.235
Because the question of infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents involves issues of both law and fact, a further ques-
tion to pose is whether a judge may parse a pure equity issue
from the larger legal action and decide the equity issue without
mind, of one of the parties (the applicant) can only be accomplished by
reissue ....
Id. at 361-62 (citations omitted). Regulations of the Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO) provide further support for the contract analogy in that they require that the
action of the PTO be based solely on the written record. Id. at 361 (quoting 37
C.F.R. § 1.2 (1995)).
231. See Amberg Brief, supra note 9, at 361-62.
232. See Wegner, supra note 81, at 18-21.
233. See Amberg Brief, supra note 9, at 361-62.
234. See Transmatic, Inc. v. Gulton Indus., Inc., 835 F. Supp. 1026, 1029 (E.D.
Mich. 1993) (citing Ensearch Corp. v. Shand Morahan & Co., 952 F.2d 1485, 1502
(5th Cir. 1992)), afld, 53 F.3d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
235. See Transmatic, 835 F. Supp. at 1028-29; Stanley L. Amberg, Equivalents
and Claim Construction: Critical Issues En Banc in the Federal Circuit, in PATENT
LrIGATION 1994, at 713, 739 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary
Property Course Handbook Series No. G-396, 1994) (discussing the conditions that
might allow trial of the doctrine to the bench alone).
One might make a further argument for the doctrine of equivalents as an issue
of pure equity. Early cases applying equivalency analysis, see, e.g., Odiorne v.
Winkley, 18 F. Cas. 581, 582-83 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No. 10,432), often also con-
cerned the issue of inequitable conduct or fraud in obtaining a patent. In those early
cases, the jury decided the question of inequitable conduct. See id. As with equiva-
lency analysis, no provision exists today in the patent statute regarding inequitable
conduct. Today, however, the question of inequitable conduct is an issue for the
judge alone to determine and may be taken from the jury in an infringement action.
Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM Lab., Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(per curiam). Although both equivalency and inequitable conduct determinations were
intended to prevent fraud on the patent system, the two doctrines nevertheless have
come to rest on opposite sides of the jury question. A fuller analysis of the
doctrine's historical parallels may provide further support for allowing only a judge
to determine infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
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a jury.26 Commentators have argued that Supreme Court pre-
cedent indicates that parsing is impermissible,"s7 and the gen-
erally accepted conclusion has been that "[diespite the disadvan-
tages of jury trials ... the [patent] system must continue to live
with juries because of' faulty precedent."8
Parsing, however, would ensure that each issue in a case
receives its proper consideration. Employing this logic, a district
court in Michigan recently determined in Transmatic, Inc. v.
Gulton Industries, Inc."9 that the doctrine of equivalents was
an equitable issue suitable for parsing from the legal infringe-
ment action.20 The Michigan court recognized that Supreme
Court precedent implicitly would allow a judge to parse equita-
ble elements from legal actions. 4' Additionally, a recent Fed-
eral Circuit case, holding that a judge alone must resolve the
issue of inequitable conduct, implied that the equitable defense
of inequitable conduct may be removed from the legal action of
infringement.4 2 Unfortunately, the question of parsing re-
mains unsettled with respect to the doctrine of equivalents; the
Federal Circuit found that the district court in Transmatic had
erred on the issue of literal infringement and therefore did not
address the issues surrounding the doctrine of equivalents or
parsing.
241
The recent Supreme Court decision in Markman, however,
lends support to the applicability of parsing. In Markman, the
Supreme Court approached the issue of claim construction as a
236. Amberg, supra note 235, at 729-39.
237. See id. at 731 (discussing the effect of Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 359
U.S. 500 (1959), and Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962), on parsing).
238. Adelnan, supra note 53, at 1005 (referring to Beacon Theaters, 359 U.S. at
500, and Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. at 469).
239. 835 F. Supp. 1026 (E.D. Mich. 1993), affd, 53 F.3d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
240. Id. at 1029 (relying on Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545 (1990)).
241. Id.
242. See, Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM Lab., Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1190
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (per curiam); infra note 375.
243. Transmatic, Inc. v. Gulton Indus., Inc., 53 F.3d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
The majority in Hilton Davis acknowledged neither Transmatic nor the fact that, in
other instances, the doctrine of equivalents has been considered purely equitable and
suitable for parsing from a legal action. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-
Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1516-29 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1014
(1996).
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question of "whether a particular issue occurring within a jury
trial... is itself necessarily a jury issue, the guarantee being
essential to preserve the right to a jury's resolution of the ulti-
mate dispute," that "ultimate dispute" being the issue of in-
fringement in general.2 In deciding that the jury should play
no role in claim construction, the Court answered its question in
the negative.2"
Even if courts were to recognize the doctrine as a matter of
pure equity, however, the problem of remedies still remains. The
second half of the Chauffeurs test considers whether the remedy
sought is of a legal or equitable nature.246 Patentees can obtain
legal or equitable remedies for infringement in the form of dam-
ages or injunctions, respectively. Regardless of the equitable
nature of the doctrine of equivalents, if the patentee seeks only
an injunction, then no jury will determine the issue; injunctions
are exclusively bench issues.248 If damages are sought, howev-
er, the balance swings in favor of conducting a jury trial.2" In
spite of the doctrine's pure equity nature, then, juries likely will
continue to be a part of doctrine of equivalents litigation when a
plaintiff seeks damages.5 Unlike the defense of inequitable
conduct, equivalency analysis remains a part of the plaintiffs
general infringement action. Basing the use of juries on the na-
ture of the remedy sought weakens the ideal of fairness inherent
in equity jurisprudence and further hampers application of the
doctrine of equivalents.
Discretionary Application of the Doctrine of Equivalents
In order to revitalize the doctrine's exceptional nature, the
trial judge should retain discretion as to its applicability." 1
244. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1389 (1996).
245. Id. at 1396.
246. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558,
565 (1990). A legal remedy would promote the use of a jury; an equitable remedy
would dissuade such use. See id. at 564.
247. 35 U.S.C. §§ 283, 284 (1994).
248. Amberg Brief, supra note 9, at 368.
249. Id. at 366-69.
250. See Adelman, supra note 53, at 1005. But see infra notes 368-80 and ac-
companying text (discussing possible altered roles for the jury).
251. Cf John E. Gartman, Infringement Under the Doctrine of Equivalents: Gazing
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The Federal Circuit's removal of the judge's discretion does not
mean, however, that the doctrine of equivalents applies in every
case. Were the doctrine of equivalents to apply in every case in
which the plaintiff had requested a jury, a judge would be un-
able to decide the issue of infringement as a matter of law. In-
stead, the issue would always have to go to a jury-under Hilton
Davis-for a determination of infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents. Yet in cases decided after Hilton Davis, the Federal
Circuit has held that the district court judge may decide the
issue of infringement as a matter of law, not only with respect to
literal infringement, but also with respect to infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents. For example, in Mark I Marketing
Corp. v. Donnelley & Sons Co., 2 the court recognized that
prosecution history still "serves as a check on the applicability of
the doctrine of equivalents" and, despite the fact that the plain-
tiff had requested a trial by jury,25 granted judgement as a
matter of law on the issue of infringement 4 Moreover, in Ath-
letic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Manufacturing, Inc.,255 the Fed-
eral Circuit explicitly held that where a patentee has claimed
restrictive values in her patent, the doctrine of equivalents can-
not apply at all. In drafting his claims precisely, the patentee in
Athletic Alternatives allowed no room for equivalents and there-
fore could not withstand summary judgment of infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents." Since Hilton Davis, the
Federal Circuit has thus recognized that a judgment as a matter
of law on the issue of infringement can stand, even where the
judgment explicitly precludes application of the doctrine of
equivalents.
These cases illustrate the Federal Circuit's reluctance to at-
tach equivalency analysis to every infringement action. Unfortu-
nately, these cases also illustrate the court's imprecise definition
into the Crystal Ball, 3 FED. Cm. B.J. 299, 304-06 (1993) (predicting that, despite
fear than an equitable threshold would cause excessive uncertainty in patent law, the
majority of the Federal Circuit would support the notion of an equitable threshold).
252. 66 F.3d 285, 291 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 97 (1996).
253. Civil Docket for Case No. 92-CV-8380, at 2 (N.D. Ill. filed Oct. 25, 1995).
254. Mark I, 66 F.3d at 292.
255. 73 F.3d 1573, 1581-83 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
256. Id. at 1582-83.
1996]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
of the term "discretion," and they open the door to semantic
arguments. One interpretation might be that the doctrine al-
ways applies, but sometimes the particular degree of equivalents
is nil. This interpretation does not account for the exclusion of a
jury, however. Another interpretation might be that the doctrine
does not apply in every case, but when it does, the judge has no
choice but to apply it. This latter interpretation begs the ques-
tion as to who should decide whether the doctrine applies in a
given case. The cases following Hilton Davis indicate that the
judge should make that decision." Taking the next logical
step, if insubstantiality of differences is the minimum necessary
requirement for infringement under the doctrine of equiva-
lents," then the judge should also determine the substantiali-
ty of differences between the patented and accused 'devices.
Granting discretionary power to the trial judge is consistent
with the Supreme Court's statement that the final determina-
tion of insubstantiality should rest with the court, which is more
familiar with science and "principles not usually contained in
the general storehouse of knowledge and experience." 9
Equity As Fairness
The Federal Circuit in Hilton Davis rejected pure equity argu-
ments and instead construed "equitable" to mean no more than
a broad ideal of fairness.26 The court maintained that the doc-
trine of equivalents had never been a doctrine of pure equi-
ty,26 ' nor had the doctrine been triable to the bench alone.Y
In light of the history and nature of the doctrine of equivalents,
257. See Athletic Alternatives, 73 F.3d at 1581-84; Mark I, 66 F.3d at 292.
258. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1518 (Fed.
Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1014 (1996).
259. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 610 (1950);
see supra notes 94-101 (discussing the Supreme Court's view of the judge as the
proper assessor of equivalency); see also Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
116 S. Ct. 1384, 1395-96 (1996) (discussing the superiority of the judge with respect
to claim construction).
260. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1521.
261. Id.
262. See id. at 1520-21.
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the Federal Circuit's assessment rings hollow. Its focus on fair-
ness, however, is not misplaced. Parties arguing to a chancellor
seek special attention to fairness in the resolution of an is-
sue.2" Although the doctrine of equivalents involves this type
of special attention, the Federal Circuit's application of equity as
a vehicle to achieve fairness unfortunately falls short of its goal.
Equity as fairness seeks to protect patentees from frauds on
their patents.2" Equity must also, however, protect accused in-
fringers from unfair trials and liability without adequate notice
of the law.2" Although the doctrine of equivalents purposely
operates in the patentee's favor to an extent,2" with its goal
being to level what was formerly a pro-defendant playing field,
the legal system still must treat the litigants fairly.26 Under
Hilton Davis, the legal system has failed to provide the neces-
sary fairness.
Much of the unfairness results from the current litigation
environment. Although juries were present in almost all of the
initial American patent cases," patent litigation came to in-
volve juries rarely and tended to work against the patentee."9
The creation of the Federal Circuit, however, has strengthened
patents and brought about a dramatic increase in both patent
litigation and jury use.7 Litigation increased by fifty percent
during the 1980s, with a jump of twenty-five percent between
1991 and 1992 alone.' In turn, litigation to juries, who strong-
263. See id. at 1521.
264. Id.
265. See White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1886); Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7
Wheat.) 356, 434 (1822); London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538
(Fed. Cir. 1991); Adelnan & Francione, supra note 103, at 682.
266. Federal Circuit Bar Brief, supra note 9, at 354.
267. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1560 (Nies, J., dissenting); Abolition, supra note
31, at 95.
268. Bradley, supra note 218, at 155 n.1.
269. Abolition, supra note 31, at 77, 84, 93-94; Nicholas M. Cannella & Timothy
J. Kelly, Jury Trials and Mock Jury Trials, in PATENT LITIGATION 1993, at 731, 738
(PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Property Course Handbook Series
No. G-375, 1993).
270. See Merz & Pace, supra note 30, at 580.
271. Id. at 580 & n.10 (citing Ludwig E. Kolman & Thomas L. Duston, In Patent
Litigation, Can Teamwork Work?, NATL L.J., Jan. 24, 1994, at S14).
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ly tend to favor patentees,272  has also increased, with
patentees prevailing significantly more often in jury trials than
in bench trials.273 The resulting "predatory" litigation in the
patent community274 has gone beyond leveling the field for the
patentee to actively operating against the accused infringer.27
Until Hilton Davis, the Federal Circuit had taken steps to coun-
teract this bias. With respect to the doctrine of equivalents, for
example, the Federal Circuit required in Pennwalt Corp. v.
Durand-Wayland, Inc.27 6 that a patentee prove element-by-
element infringement,277 thereby placing a greater burden on
the patentee to prove infringement. The Federal Circuit failed to
keep pace, however. Hilton Davis effectively negated such gains
to defendants and returned an unfair advantage to litigious
patentees.
The Need To Consider Intent
The pro-patentee environment under Hilton Davis calls for a
retooling of the doctrine of equivalents that will (1) forestall the
doctrine's improper use and diminish the incentive to forego the
reissue process in favor of suing under the doctrine of equiva-
lents,27 (2) restore the doctrine's exceptional status,27 ' and
272. See infra notes 356-67 and accompanying text.
273. See Abolition, supra note 31, at 84. During the period 1979-1989, patentees
won 62% of the time before a jury and 49% of the time before a judge. Cannella &
Kelly, supra note 269, at 739.
274. See Chu, supra note 33, at 1341-55; see also Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v.
Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Plager, J., dissenting)
(noting the regular use of the doctrine of equivalents in order to gain protection
greater than that granted by statute), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1014 (1996); Adelman
& Francione, supra note 103, at 683 (noting that the doctrine of equivalents has al-
lowed abusive patent litigation).
275. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1534 (Newman, J., concurring); id. at 1560
(Nies, J., dissenting); Robert L. Harmon, Seven New Rules of Thumb: How the Fed-
eral Circuit Has Changed the Way Patent Lawyers Advise Clients, 14 GEo. MASON U.
L. REv. 573, 582 (1992).
276. 833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1009 (1988).
277. Id. at 935. Viewing each element within the context of the entire claim, the
court in Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1533 (Fed.
Cir. 1987), observed that "[ilt is . . . well settled that each element of a claim is mate-
rial and essential, and that, in order for a court to find infringement, the plaintiff
must show the presence of every element or its substantial equivalent in the accused
device." (quoting Lemelson v. United States, 752 F.2d 1538, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
278. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1560 (Nies, J., dissenting); Adelman "&
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(3) remove a general jury bias against defendants."0
In Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products
Co.,281 the Supreme Court held that insubstantial differences
are a "necessary predicate" for infringement under the doctrine
of equivalents." 2 The Court neither held nor implied, however,
that insubstantial differences are the sole sufficient predicate.
The Supreme Court repeatedly has held that the doctrine serves
to prevent the "unscrupulous copyist"2" from committing
"fraud on a patent."' Although the Court has not required in-
tent specifically, both the history85 and the objective..6 of the
Francione, supra note 103, at 715-20.
279. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1537 (Plager, J., dissenting).
280. See Harmon, supra note 275, at 582.
281. 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
282. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1517.
283. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607.
284. Id. at 608; see Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929);
Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 344 (1853).
The majority in Hilton Davis construed this language to mean that the doctrine
of equivalents exists to "prevent 'fraud on a patent,' not fraud by the accused in-
fringer." Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1519 (quoting Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608) (cita-
tions omitted). The intended distinction is not convincing. Construing "fraud" to refer
to the amount of difference between devices, id. at 1519, does not dismiss the issue
of intent. Inseparable from fraud is the connotation of "perjury, ... misrepresenta-
tion[,]" Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 657 (1946) (concerning fraud outside
the context of patents), and intent. The PTO has recognized the connection between
intent and fraud: "[N]o patent will be granted on an application in connection with
which fraud on the Office was practiced or attempted or the duty of disclosure was
violated through bad faith or intentional misconduct." Duty to Disclose Information
Material to Patentability, 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1994) (emphasis added). Moreover, the
references in Graver Tank to the "unscrupulous copyist," piracy, and stealing, Graver
Tank, 339 U.S. at 607, compel the inclusion of intent in equivalency analysis.
285. See Odiorne v. Winkley, 18 F. Cas. 581, 582-83 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No.
10,432). In Odiorne, Justice Story left the question of intent to the jury, noting that
a finding of infringement would result in treble damages. Id. at 583. Justice Story's
logic appears to follow from the fact that, when one obtained a patent at that time,
the law presumed that he did so in light of all existing patents. Id. at 582-83. If a
patent issued that nevertheless infringed another existing patent, the second paten-
tee was thus deemed to have acted "surreptitiously." Id. at 582. Such a "surrepti-
tious" act, having the required willfulness, warranted an award of enhanced damag-
es. See id. at 583. If a finding of infringement automatically resulted in an award of
treble damages for willful infringement, then it follows that intent was necessary for
a determination of infringement by equivalency. See also Gray v. James, 10 F. Cas.
1015, 1018 (C.C.D. Pa. 1817) (No. 5718) (noting the applicability of intent); Joseph
R. Re & Lynda J. Zadra-Symes, Infringement Under the Doctrine of Equivalents: The
Federal Circuit's First Ten Years, 785 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 77, 113 (1992), available in
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doctrine of equivalents -urge consideration of intent. The majori-
ty in Hilton Davis, however, declined to consider intent in con-
junction with substantiality of differences in its application of
the doctrine.8 7
The majority's discussion of intent ultimately belies itself. The
court was receptive only to considering-in varying de-
grees-copying, designing around, and independent develop-
ment. Copying refers to the outright theft of the patented inven-
tion288 and, by definition, requires intent. Designing around,
sometimes characterized as a sanctioned form of copying,2 9 re-
fers to a competitor's attempt to avoid the patent's claims in
order to advance the state-of-the-art and fuel the competition
that characterizes the patent system.21 Courts therefore re-
gard evidence of designing around favorably.291 Independent
development refers to the case in which a competitor creates his
device without knowledge or notice of the patented device.292
The court stated that evidence of independent development
was relevant only to the issue of damages and had no effect on
the amount of difference between the patented and accused
devices .2 " Evidence of copying, however, was directly relevant
to the issue of infringement and created a "suggestion" that the
differences were insubstantial. 2' Also directly relevant was
evidence of designing around.295 Unlike copying, evidence of de-
signing around created a "suggestion" that the differences were
in fact substantial.
As a preliminary matter, the Federal Circuit made a consider-
able leap in logic by noting that the presence of copying or de-
Westlaw, TP-ALL Library (noting that intent has been the "overriding equitable
factor resulting in the doctrine's applicability").
286. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1548 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
287. See id. at 1519-20.
288. See Robb, supra note 68, at 282.
289. Katz, supra note 67, at 316.
290. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1520; Robb, supra note 68, at 282.
291. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1520.
292. See Robb, supra note 68, at 282.
293. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1520.
294. Id. at 1519.
295. Id. at 1520.
296. Id.
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signing around will effect the substantiality of differences (and
that the presence of independent development will have no such
effect). As an absolute value, the actual amount of difference
between devices would remain constant; neither copying, nor
designing around, nor independent development can alter these
static, physical manifestations. These factors do, however, reflect
whether the differences at issue were the result of piracy or
innovation. 97 In this way, they go more to the overall issue of
infringement, not the amount of variation between the patented
and accused devices.
Accordingly, any analysis under the doctrine of equivalents
should separate these factors, and their attendant "suggestions,"
from the question of substantiality. To attach copying and de-
signing around to the question of substantiality is to provide the
fact finder with a facade behind which it can factor in evidence
of intent."9 The Federal Circuit's analysis challenges logic and
suppresses the true nature of the doctrine of equivalents.
Moreover, an explanation as to how two forms of copy-
ing--copying per se and designing around-result in polar infer-
ences rests only on a consideration of the competitor's intent.
Application of the Federal Circuit's analysis requires that copy-
ing (per se) lead to a suggestion of insubstantial differences. 9
The suggestion arises not because those differences are insub-
stantial in a technical sense. It arises merely because the com-
petitor intended to do no more than steal the patented invention.
Similarly, the suggestion of substantial differences that accom-
panies designing around arises not from the actual technical
differences, but from the mere fact that the competitor intended
not to steal the patented invention.
With regard to independent development, the majority misin-
terpreted the Supreme Court's view of independent research in
297. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 612 (1950).
298. The court's statement that "[elvidence of independent development is highly
relevant, however, to refute a patent owner's contention that the doctrine of equiva-
lents applies because the accused infringer copied, that is, ' ntentionally appropriated
the substance of the claimed invention," Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1520 (emphasis
added), provides a definition of "copied" that further blurs the court's distinction be-
tween the infringement and damages phases of trial.
299. Id. at 1519.
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Graver Tank. The Supreme Court in Graver Tank stated that
"[w]ithout some explanation or indication that [the accused de-
vice] was developed by independent research, the trial court could
properly infer that the accused [device] is the result of imitation
rather than experimentation or invention.""' Independent re-
search and the intent to copy, or their absence, then, was of
substantial importance to the Supreme Court's analysis. 0'
The Federal Circuit's discussion of intent discounts the Su-
preme Court's concerns in Graver Tank, and becomes logically
inconsistent when their analyzed beyond its face-value. In its
review of Hilton Davis, the Supreme Court should therefore rec-
ognize openly the importance of intent and require its presence in
any finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
Without intent, the doctrine of equivalents is no more than a
second stab at proving infringement for the patentee, and the
doctrine loses both its equitable nature and its justification.3"'
Consideration of intent should take into account whether the
accused device is the result of independent development (involv-
ing no copying), copying in order to design around the patented
device (involving a constructive employment of copying and
respect for the patent system), or copying in order to pirate the
patented device (involving a subversive employment of copying
in an effort to circumvent the patent system).3 '
Requiring intent for a finding of infringement under the doc-
trine of equivalents can also serve as a deterrent. Behavior, not
end-products, motivates the doctrine.0 4 If a defendant loses a
case on equivalence, a second competitor is unlikely to venture
300. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 612 (emphasis added).
301. Id.; see also Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 334 (1853) (noting
that one device, made without reference to another device, does not infringe when it
arrives at the same end).
302. Indeed, in its brief to the Supreme Court, Hilton Davis used language indi-
cating the role of intent, stating that the doctrine of equivalents "mak[es] it difficult
for a copier to simply maneuver around a patent's claims by making only 'insubstan-
tial changes'." Respondent's Brief in Opposition at 14, Hilton Davis (No. 95-728)
(emphasis added) (quoting Larson, infra note 346, at 11).
303. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1547-49 (Lourie, J., dissenting); International
Visual Corp. v. Crown Metal Mfg. Co., 991 F.2d 768, 775 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Lourie,
J., concurring).
304. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1548 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
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near the same ground unless he possesses more favorable equi-
ties, such as evidence sufficient to show his good behavior.0 5
Consequently, requiring intent gives the competitor additional
notice of what constitutes infringement by alerting the competi-
tor to what behavior is not acceptable. Other factors in addition
to intent should enter the analysis to the extent they are ap-
plicable. Although considering factors beyond the func-
tion/way/result test may appear to muddy the waters unneces-
sarily,"6 such consideration not only provides competitors with
better information regarding infringement,3 7 but it also com-
ports with the Supreme Court's aim to avoid a formulaic ap-
proach to the doctrine of equivalents. 8 If a competitor doubts
that his device contains substantial differences, he will know
that any continued manufacture, sale, or use of his device must
be in good faith. Requiring intent as a threshold to equivalency
analysis would also reduce the number of cases reviewed under
the doctrine of equivalents, and coincides with the history and
nature of the doctrine, both of which urge the restriction of its
use to exceptional cases.0 9
Due Process Under the Doctrine of Equivalents
Additionally, the Federal Circuit's articulation of the doctrine
of equivalents fails to address adequately questions regarding
due process under the Fifth Amendment.310 The sense of fair-
ness that motivates the Fifth Amendment animates the Federal
Circuit's notion of equity embodied in the doctrine of equiva-
lents.3  In Hilton Davis, however, the Federal Circuit did not
305. Id. (Lourie, J., dissenting).
306. See Landry, supra note 130, at 1196-98.
307. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1547-48 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
308. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950).
309. London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991);
see Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 617 (Black, J., dissenting).
310. U.S.. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law . . ").
311. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1521
(Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1014 (1996); cf Patrick Devlin, Equity, Due
Process and the Seventh Amendment: A Commentary on the Zenith Case, 81 MICH. L.
REV. 1571, 1583-605 (1983) (discussing due process as equity in the context of com-
plex cases).
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apply that sense of fairness equally to both parties. The court
failed to consider the importance of notice to the defendant.
Furthermore, the court placed an admittedly complex analytical
tool in the hands of laymen 12 and ignored the attendant ef-
fects that complexity and bias create in a jury trial. 1 '
The Need for Notice
Often quoted for its whimsical imagery, the "wax nose" pas-
sage in White v. Dunbar"1 4 drives home the serious need for
notice of what will constitute infringement. For those competi-
tors who follow the spirit of the Intellectual Property Clause1 5
and continue to develop technology, a finding of infringement by
equivalency without sufficient notice can mean a deprivation of
property without due process of law.1 6
Lack of adequate notice as a result of inaccurate claims is
especially unfair to the defendant in light of the patentee's op-
portunity to cure any deficient claims within two years of the
patent's issuance.1 7 Much like the doctrine of equivalents, the
reissue process allows the patentee to enlarge the scope of pro-
312. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1531-32 (Newman, J., concurring); Collins,
supra note 53, at 311.
313. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1563 (Nies, J., dissenting); infra notes 334-67,
and accompanying text.
314. 119 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1886). The Court stated that:
Some persons seem to suppose that a claim in a patent is like a nose of
wax which may be turned and twisted in any direction... so as to
make it include something more than, or something different from, what
its words express .... The claim is a statutory requirement, prescribed
for the very purpose of making the patentee define precisely what his
invention is; and it is unjust to the public, as well as an evasion of the
law, to construe it in a manner different from the plain import of its
terms.
Id.
315. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
316. See Adelman & Francione, supra note 103, at 683; supra notes 26-29 and ac-
companying text (discussing the adverse effects of the doctrine of equivalents on
technological advancements). In discussing claim construction, the Supreme Court
noted that without the consistency of a judge, "'[the public [would] be deprived of
rights supposed to belong to it, without being clearly told what it is that limits
those rights.'" Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1396 (1996)
(alterations in original) (quoting Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 573 (1877)).
317. See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1994); 4 CHISUM, supra note 49, § 15.03.
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tection."8' During the interim between a patent's grant and re-
issue, competitors who have produced devices that later become
subject to the reissue process are entitled to intervening
rights. 19 Those rights protect a competitor's acts that, though
once considered innocent under the patent, are later considered
to infringe on the patent.32 ° Without those rights, competitors
would face infringement liability without adequate notice.3 ' In
reforming the patent, the doctrine of equivalents achieves the
same end as reissue, 22 but makes no comparable intervening
rights available to the competitor."m
In an area of law known for its uncertainty, the doctrine of
equivalents would benefit greatly from added certainty and
uniformity. As the Supreme Court recognized in Markman, the
court can provide uniform treatment of an issue sufficient to
warrant a reduced role for the jury." Without adequate no-
tice, the defendant enjoys neither the certainty nor the safe-
guards that accompany the reissue process. Viewed in this light,
the doctrine of equivalents is more a due process violation
against the defendant than an equitable remedy for the paten-
tee. 25 Recognition of the need for notice through precise claim-
ing has propelled statutory amendments with the hope of alert-
ing competitors as to what "actions [will] infringe a granted
patent."326 Indeed, Hilton Davis represents an attempt to pro-
vide notice, and the Federal Circuit's version of the doctrine of
equivalents supplies notice of how courts will employ equivalen-
318. See 35 U.S.C. § 251; 4 CHISUM, supra note 49, § 15.03[1]; supra note 65.
319. 35 U.S.C. § 252; 4 CHISUM, supra note 49, § 15.05[2]-[3].
320. 4 CHISUM, supra note 49, § 15.05[2]-[3].
321. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1560 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (Nies, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1014 (1996).
322. "[Tjhe purpose of the doctrine [is not] to cure errors curable by reis-
sue . . . ." Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1542
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (Newman, J., dissenting).
323. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1560 (Nies, J., dissenting). Professors Adelman and
Francione suggest liberalizing the reissue process in order to remove the incentive to
bypass reissue in favor of the doctrine of equivalents. Adelman & Francione, supra
note 103, at 715-21.
324. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1396 (1996).
325. Adelman & Francione, supra note 103, at 682.
326. See London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir.
1991); supra notes 78-92 and accompanying text.
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cy analysis. The doctrine under Hilton Davis provides little no-
tice, however, as to what actions that analysis will scruti-
nize.327
Juries in Equivalency Analysis
"Where history and precedent provide no clear answers, func-
tional considerations also play their part in the choice between
judge and jury . ,,.13 The inability to predict the possible
outcome of litigation "is exacerbated when juries, whose mem-
bers usually lack both technological and legal training, are ap-
plying the doctrine of equivalents."3 29 Historically, patent cases
have employed juries sporadically,330 and not until recently did
a panel of laypersons work in the patentee's favor.33 ' The cre-
ation of the Federal Circuit reversed the antipatentee atmo-
sphere,s3 2 and, today, the tide has turned against the defen-
dant such that "the deck. .. is stacked in favor of the paten-
tee... . In addition to having the Federal Circuit's sup-
port,3 4 the patentee now has the added advantage of potential
juror miscomprehension and favorable juror bias.
Juries and the Comprehension of Technology
"Explaining to jurors is one thing. Whether they understand is
an entirely different matter."3 5 Courts have long recognized
the difficulties inherent in determining theft of a patented "prin-
327. See Collins, supra note 208, at 7.
328. Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1395 (discussing claim construction).
[Wihen an issue falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a
simple historical fact, the fact/law distinction at times has turned on a
determination that, as a matter of the sound administration of justice,
one judicial actor is better positioned that another to decide the issue in
question.
Id. (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)).
329. Adelman & Francione, supra note 103, at 682 n.34.
330. Abolition, supra note 31, at 84, 93-94.
331. Id. at 84.
332. See supra notes 269-78 and accompanying text.
333. Abolition, supra note 31, at 84.
334. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE
DOCTRINES 365 (3d ed. rev. 1993).
335. Abolition, supra note 31, at 96.
362 [Vol. 38:319
1996] DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS 363
ciple."33 s Much debate has surrounded the application of the
"complexity exception" to patent cases, albeit with no resolution
of the issue.3 ' Stemming from a footnote in a 1970 Supreme
Court case 3 ' the complexity argument posits that complex
matters will confound laypersons. Allowing jurors to decide is-
sues that lie beyond their full understanding thus violates due
process under the Fifth Amendment.33
Whether patent cases actually involve matters too complex for
juries is unsettled."0 The preponderance of support currently
favors those who argue that no reason exists to believe that a
trial judge, who only rarely presides over a patent case, is any
336. Gray v. James, 10 F. Cas. 1015, 1016 (C.C.D. Pa. 1817) (No. 5718).
337. See SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. 775 F.2d 1107, 1127-31 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (Markey, C.J., offering additional views); id. at 1132 (Davis, J., concurring in
the result); Abolition, supra note 31, at 84-85; Tom Arnold, Alternative Dispute Reso-
lution in Intellectual Property Cases, in PATENT LITIGATION 1992, at 667, 673-74 (PLI
Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Property Course Handbook Series No.
G-350, 1992); Joe S. Cecil et al., Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: Lessons
from Civil Jury Trials, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 727, 752-56 (1991) (exploring case studies
of jury comprehension in complex trials); Stephen B. Judlowe & Lee A. Goldberg,
Jury Trials, in PATENT LITIGATION 1994, at 173, 173-94 (PLI Patents, Copyrights,
Trademarks, & Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. G-397, 1994); Edmund
J. Sease, Ten Commandments of a Defendant's Patent Case, in PATENT LITIGATION
1993, at 603, 606-07 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Property
Course Handbook Series No. G-375, 1993); The Eleventh Annual Judicial Conference
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 153 F.R.D. 177, 236-52
(1993) [hereinafter Conference].
338. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970).
339. See Devlin, supra note 311, at 1594-605. The concern in patent cases is not
one of intelligence or ignorance, but one of comprehension or misunderstanding.
Mark Twain's quip that "the jury system puts a ban upon intelligence and honesty,
and a premium upon ignorance, stupidity and perjury," Joseph C. Wilkinson Jr. et
al., A Bicentennial Transition: Modern Alternatives to Seventh Amendment Jury Trial
in Complex Cases, 37 U. KAN. L. REv. 61, 64 (1988) (quoting MARK TWAIN, ROUGH-
ING IT 349 (Hamlin Hill ed., Penguin Books 1981) (1872)), loses its comedic value
when cases turn on a jury's inadequate understanding of the subject matter.
340. See Abolition, supra note 31, at 84-85; Conference, supra note 337, at 236-52.
In 1989, the ABA conducted a study of jury comprehension in complex cases. Cecil et
al., supra note 337, at 750 n.146, 752-53. The study involved four cases: one each on
sexual harassment, antitrust, insurance fraud, and trade secrets. Id. at 752. Three of
the four alternate juries reached different verdicts than the real juries. Id. at 753.
The study's accuracy and applicability are questionable, however, because it only
surveyed 50 jurors, John E. Kidd, Jury Trials and Mock Jury Trials, in PATENT LmI-
GATION 1991, at 137, 156 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Property
Course Handbook Series No. 321, 1991), and the study involved no patent cases.
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better equipped to handle the complex issues than a panel of ju-
rors."4 Yet, a pervasive feeling of unease in giving patent cas-
es over to juries persists.342 Opponents of juries maintain with
conviction that even sporadic review of patent cases affords
judges the advantage of at least some familiarity with the issues
and analysis involved. 43 Though speaking to the issue of claim
construction, the Supreme Court in Markman echoed its Graver
Tank characterization of the judge as a storehouse of knowledge:
"The judge, from his training and discipline, is more likely to
give a proper interpretation to such instruments [patents] than
a jury; and he is, therefore, more likely to be right, in per-
forming such a duty, than a jury can be expected to be."344
That logic readily carries over to equivalency analysis.
Proponents of juries as fact finders in doctrine of equivalents
cases insist that performing a function/way/result analysis in-
volves the same level of juror competence and discretion as
gauging ordinary negligence.3 45 The fact remains, however,
that "[tihe doctrine of equivalents requires judges and juries
with no technical training to determine whether parts of com-
plex technology are equivalent to complex patent claims.""4'
Faced with this task, jurors often employ a device-to-device
comparison rather than an element-by-element comparison."
In other words, juries are more apt to "eyeball" the devices than
to compare accurately the claim elements of the patented device
to the elements present on the accused device.
The debate over the complexity exception continues with no
clear resolution in sight. 48 Markman does provide some in-
341. See, e.g., Conference, supra note 337, at 250-52.
342. See, e.g., Arnold, supra note 337, at 673-74.
343. In addition to better dealing with complexity, judges are better trained, can
better control the pace of a trial, and can better absorb facts outside the courtroom.
Adelman, supra note 53, at 1004. In contrast, the inherent delays and lack of exper-
tise of juries render them inefficient. Id. at 1004-05 & nn.100-01.
344. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1395 (1996)
(quoting Parker v. Hulme, 18 F. Cas. 1138, 1140 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1849) (No. 10,740)).
345. See, e.g., ABA Brief, supra note 10, at 379-80.
346. Ronald E. Larson, Balancing the Competing Policies Underlying the Doctrine
of Equivalents in Patent Law, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 6 (1993).
347. Sease, supra note 337, at 608. See supra text accompanying note 115 for
Professor Chisum's explanation of the proper comparison.
348. See supra note 340 and accompanying text.
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sight, however. The Court relied, in part, on the increased tech-
nical nature of modern claims in its restriction of the jury from
the issue of claim construction and, in so doing, provided a
vague glimpse of what may mature into a complexity excep-
tion.349 If a resolution ever emerges, however, that resolution
will likely be that complexity alone will not suffice to remove
juries from patent cases. Something more is necessary to illus-
trate the inappropriateness of juries in determining the ultimate
issue of infringement in doctrine of equivalents trials.
Jury Bias
That something more is jury bias. The issue of jury bias in
patent cases is often overlooked. This variable, however, impacts
the determination of both complex and simple issues and is just
as dangerous to the notion of equity as complexity:350
True or not, many and probably most patent litigators...
believe that the natural bias of a jury these days is in favor
of the patentee. Show the jury that beribboned patent doc-
ument, and establish that the defendant is doing something
pretty close to what is patented, and the question becomes
not validity or infringement but simply how much?351
The above statement illustrates the danger that bias may pres-
ent in any patent litigation. Moreover, it addresses several as-
pects of the bias problem specific to doctrine of equivalents: (1)
the natural bias of the jury toward the patentee, (2) the persua-
sive effect of the patent grant alone on the jury, and (3) the
tendency of the jury to bypass the crucial question of substanti-
ality.
Generally pro-patent,35 2 juries hold the PTO in high
349. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1395 (1996)
(quoting William R. Woodward, Definiteness and Particularity in Patent Claims, 46
MICH. L. REV. 755, 765 (1948)).
350. "In addition to the complexity factor, which is technically oriented,... juries
are much more susceptible than our judges to being influenced by irrelevant issues."
Abolition, supra note 31, at 87-88.
351. Harmon, supra note 275, at 582.
352. Sease, supra note 337, at 608.
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regard. 5 ' Although they often misunderstand the prosecution
process,3" juries assume that an invention undergoes the high-
est level of scrutiny before a patent issues. 55 Unfortunately,
this is not always the case. The PTO does make mistakes, and
often the patents-in-suit lack the degree of integrity that jurors
attribute to them.356
Similarly, juries also tend to idealize inventors.37 Before the
jury is a plaintiff who, in using her talent, skills, and effort to
invent something, has received the recognition of the United
States of America. Such a person may inspire awe and therefore
bias jurors in her favor. 8 When the plaintiff presents the offi-
cial grant, bearing red ribbon, gold seal, and the Commissioner's
signature, the defendant must face not only the legal presump-
tion of validity but also the jurors' preexisting, personal belief in
that validity.
When one couples these initial biases with misunderstandings
of the function/way/result analysis,359 misunderstandings of
permissible and impermissible copying,3' and misunder-
standings of the complex issues at bar,361 one can hardly con-
sider a jury's infringement determination to be an equitable
resolution. Even if a juror attempts to remain impartial, a mis-
understanding of the material may tempt the juror, by default,
to rely upon the notion that, of the two devices, the patentee's
must be better. After all, the government has at least validated
that invention and honored the patentee for her contribution to
technological progress. The combination of bias and complexity
presents unfair obstacles to the defendant, if it does not ulti-
353. Id.
354. Judlowe & Goldberg, supra note 337, at 176.
355. Cannella & Kelly, supra note 269, at 741-42.
356. See id.
357. Id. at 742; see Timothy L. Swabb, Federal Circuit Cannot Stop Runaway Ju-
ry Awards in Patent Suits: Companies Should Insure Themselves Against This Risk,
3 MEALEY'S LITIGATION REPORTS: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 20 (1995) ("Jurors readily
believe that competitors unfairly use patents owned by others.").
358. The plaintiff often enhances the bias by presenting the inventor as a single
inventor against a large corporate defendant, conjuring images of David versus Goli-
ath. See Cannella & Kelly, supra note 269, at 742.
359. See Sease, supra note 337, at 608-09.
360. See id. at 609.
361. Larson, supra note 346, at 6.
366 [Vol. 38:319
1 DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
mately strip him of his entire case.
A More Appropriate Assignment of Duties
Although some commentators advocate the total removal of
juries from patent cases,362 such a wholesale removal, proper
or not, could deepen the rift already present in the patent com-
munity. Instead, as Judges Plager and Lourie suggested in
Hilton Davis, the judge and jury in doctrine of equivalents cases
should share responsibility for equivalency analysis." Employ-
ing the salient aspects of Judges Plager's and Lourie's sugges-
tions, such a compromise of duties would effectively prevent a
compromise in the doctrine. The judge should remain responsi-
ble for determining the scope of equivalency for the claims, as
well as for determining whether the amount of difference be-
tween the devices mandates application of the doctrine of
equivalents." Placing discretion in the judge's hands comports
with Graver Tank's desire for a determination by one familiar
with the subject3" and preserves the doctrine's role as the ex-
ception rather than the rule of patent infringement analysis. 66
In order to facilitate the effectiveness of the judges' determi-
nations, the Federal Circuit should provide trial judges with
proper guidance regarding insubstantiality."7 If insubstantial
differences exist, the jury should then find whether intent is
present and, if so, its nature and degree. The jury should also
362. See, e.g., Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512,
1543 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Plager, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1014 (1996);
id. at 1549 (Lourie, J., dissenting); Conference, supra note 337, at 236-50.
363. See supra notes 189-95 and accompanying text.
364. Although the ABA did not take a position on the use of juries, it recognized the
trial judge's discretion in applying the doctrine. See ABA Brief, supra note 10, at 379.
365. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 610 (1950).
366. See supra notes 88-92, 221-26, 252-60 and accompanying text.
367. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1543-44
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (Plager, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1014 (1996). Judge
Nies has suggested that the principles underlying nonobviousness (the requirement
that an invention, even though novel, must not be an obvious or expected advance
to one skilled in the art, see 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994)) could supply an adequate test
for determining "insubstantial changell." See Roton Barrier, Inc. v. Stanley Works, 79
F.3d 1112, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Nies, J., offering additional views) (quoting Hilton
Davis, 62 F.3d at 1519).
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find any other applicable factors." The judge should then
weigh the substantiality of differences against intent and the
other factors in order to make the final determination regarding
infringement. 69
The jury's role as a fact finder is critical." ' In a situation
where damages are sought under the doctrine of equivalents, the
jury must find the questions of fact common to both the legal
issue (general literal infringement) and the equitable issue (doc-
trine of equivalents)." 1 Many of the facts helpful to the equiva-
lency analysis are available to the jury in the literal analysis
stage. After literal analysis, the jury may find other facts, if
necessary. Having found the applicable facts, the jury's duty
would be complete. 2 Regardless of the type of remedy sought,
the judge may then weigh those facts against the degree of
insubstantiality in an equitable manner. '
The issue of using juries in equivalency analysis persists
largely as a function of history. The doctrine of equivalents in-
volves questions of fact in addition to questions of law, and it
repeatedly has gone to juries uncontested. In light of the para-
368. See supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text.
369. The Federal Circuit has recognized the use of a similar apportionment of du-
ties in the context of inequitable conduct. See Baxter Healthcare Corp. v.
Spectramed, Inc., 49 F.3d 1575, 1584 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 272 (1995);
General Electro Music Corp. v. Samick Music Corp., 19 F.3d 1405, 1408 (Fed. Cir.
1994); LEONARD B. SAND ET AL., MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, § 86.03
(1996). Ordinarily, resolution of the facts underlying a determination of inequitable
conduct is a task for the judge alone. Baxter Healthcare, 49 F.3d at 1584. The par-
ties, however, may consent to resolution of the facts by a jury, and in such a case,
the judge will weigh the jury's findings in order to make an equitable decision. Id.;
General Electro Music, 19 F.3d at 1408.
370. "As a general matter, the right to a trial by jury in federal courts means the
right to have the facts in evidence determined by the unanimous verdict of an impar-
tial panel ... ." HON. EDWARD J. DEVIrrr & CHARLES B. BLACKMAR, 1 FEDERAL
JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 1.01 (2d ed. 1970) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
371. See 1 DOBBS, supra note 165, § 2.1[3], at 65-66.
372. Cf. 1 DEVITT & BLACKMAR, supra note 370, § 1.01 (emphasizing the jury's
role as fact finder). The Markman decision emphasizes the limits on jury in-
volvement in patent cases. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct.
1384 (1996).
373. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1543-44
(Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1014 (1996) (Plager, J., dissenting); id. at
1549-50 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
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bolic history of juries in patent cases in general, however, one
cannot conclude that juries must be a part of equivalency analy-
sis. The Chauffeurs test also fails to command convincingly a
primary role for juries in equivalency analysis. More important-
ly, given the historical lack of confidence in equivalency analysis
and recent favoritism toward patentees, the Federal Cir-
cuit-indeed, the Supreme Court-must address more responsi-
bly the issue of juries in doctrine of equivalents cases if the
Federal Circuit's characterization of "equity" is to have force.
Assigning duties in the manner detailed above accounts for both
the nature of the doctrine of equivalents and the characteristics
of juries in patent cases.
CONCLUSION
Even though many commentators view Hilton Davis as re-
turning the doctrine of equivalents to its roots as a tool of equi-
ty, 74 the doctrine, as articulated in Hilton Davis, actually op-
erates against fairness. Although the decision certainly har-
kened back to the early days of doctrine, it failed to account for
certain overriding themes of those early equivalency cases. Once
invoked only as the exception, courts now almost automatically
apply the doctrine in the absence of literal infringement.75 In
the modern pro-patent litigation environment the doctrine of
equivalents has allowed patentees to take advantage of inade-
374. See, e.g., Hoffinan & Oliver, supra note 29.
375. See Adelman & Francione, supra note 103, at 699; cf. Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari, Warner-Jenkinson Co., at 17 n.17, Hilton Davis (No. 95-728) (quoting CAL
Brief for Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property Law Ass'n at 5-6) ("[Slome
patentees have more frequently alleged infiingement of their patents . . . which are
increasingly beyond the literal scope of the patent claims-assertions which could be
alleged only under the doctrine of equivalents."). Note also the incentives created re-
garding claim drafting. Although the decision in Markman might compel more pre-
cise claim drafting, Machonkin, supra note 9, at 203 n.119, the decision in Hilton
Davis negates that compulsion by removing the judge's discretion in applying the
doctrine of equivalents. Indeed, claim drafters look to the doctrine of equivalents for
refuge should their claims lack the necessary precision. Without the doctrine of
equivalents, "[mlore than 1.5 million presently unexpired patents written with the
expectation of protection against infringement through the Doctrine of Equivalents
would be thrown into question and significantly devalued." Respondent's Brief in
Opposition at 15, Hilton Davis (No. 95-728) (emphasis added). Such an expectation
fails to encourage precision in claim drafting.
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quate notice, as well as juror miscomprehension and bias. Al-
though the Federal Circuit has taken some measures to restrict
certain aspects of the doctrine,376 these measures have proven
insufficient.3 7
An effective approach to the doctrine of equivalents would
modify both the test and the roles of the judge and jury to reflect
better the goals of the patent system. Application of the doctrine
should include not only function/way/result analysis but also
consideration of the defendant's intent and other relevant fac-
tdrs. Requiring proof of both insubstantiality and intent main-
tains the purpose of the doctrine in preventing piracy. Further-
more, responsibility for determining infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents, if not given to the judge alone, should be
shared by the judge and jury in a manner that preserves the
historical role of the jury as fact finder and the necessary role of
the judge as weigher of equities.
Such a structure maintains the spirit motivating the doctrine
of equivalents, not as an equitable issue once tried to a chancel-
lor in eighteenth-century England, but as an equitable issue of
modern fairness.
Jonathon Taylor Reavill
376. See, e.g., Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1009 (1988).
377. Some commentators have suggested that the Federal Circuit should go fur-
ther and remove juries from doctrine of equivalents cases altogether. See, e.g., Hilton
Davis, 62 F.3d at 1543 (Plager, J., dissenting); id. at 1549 (Lourie, J., dissenting);
Abolition, supra note 31, at 85-88; Conference, supra note 337, at 240-50. Although
such a measure would account for the bias problem and much of the complexity
problem, it would not account for the "traditional" role of juries in infringement
actions. Others have suggested modifying the test. See, e.g., Roger Barrett, Discre-
tionary Use of the Patent Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Law: Going Beyond the
Triple Identity Test of Graver Tank, 17 U. HAW. L. REv. 513 (1995); Andrei Iancu, A
Two-Track Approach to the Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Law: Responding to
Hilton Davis, 35 JURMMETRICS J. 325, 339-47 (1995). These approaches, however,
ignore the problems associated with juries.
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